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Despite a large body of literature addressing the issue, questions remain about whether 
nonprofit hospitals provide more community benefit than do for-profit hospitals. This 
lack of information impacts governments, hospitals, and the healthcare industry, as 
stakeholders attempt to generate requirements to which hospitals should adhere to 
maintain nonprofit status, and thus tax exemption. This study addressed this lack of 
information by examining U.S. hospitals through the lens of stewardship theory to 
determine whether nonprofits are better stewards of the public good than for-profits, and 
thus likely to provide higher quality and access. The study applied logistic regression to 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) data indicating levels of perceived 
quality, or patient satisfaction, and American Hospital Association data identifying 
service mix profitability, an indicator of access. The sample included all 2,701 U.S. 
hospitals receiving CMS funding. Findings indicated that high quality hospitals were 
more likely to be nonprofit than for-profit (b = 0.07; Exp(B) = 1.07; p = .000). Neutral 
access hospitals, those with mid-range service mix profitability, were more likely to be 
nonprofit than for-profit (b = 1.73; Exp(B) = 5.63; p = .000) as were high access 
hospitals, those with low service mix profitability (b = .276; Exp(B) = 1.32; p = .04). The 
𝑅𝐿
2 for the models was .06 and .03, respectively. Given this limited predictive power, it 
seems unlikely the added value (access and quality) nonprofits are likely to provide 
justifies tax exemption. If further research supports this argument for other potentially 
relevant variables such as technical quality of care, governments could remove nonprofit 
hospitals’ tax exemptions and apply the resulting tax revenue to other policy areas to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
Nonprofit hospitals benefit from their nonprofit status because governments forgo 
realizing the property and sales tax they would generate as for profits in exchange for the 
provision of community benefit. The tax benefits nonprofits receive are a form of 
payment for the community benefit they provide. For-profits are not seen as providing as 
much community benefit and are thus ineligible tax exemption. There is a dearth of 
conclusive scholarly evidence suggesting that this is the case, however.  Outcomes of 
studies in the extant literature addressing these differences, such as those conducted by 
Plante (2009), Bazzoli, Clement, and Hsieh, (2010), Horwitz and Nichols (2011), Kim, 
Mccue, and Thompson (2009), and Principe, Adams, Maynard, and Becker (2012) 
illustrated mixed evidence. Few of these studies addressed differences in quality and 
access between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, though determining whether 
differences in quality and access exist between them is relevant to the debate, as both of 
these variables are related to the community benefit requirement the Internal Revenue 
Service uses to determine whether a hospital should maintain nonprofit status and 
continue to earn the tax benefits it receives. This lack of research impacts governments, 
hospitals, and the entire healthcare industry, as stakeholders attempt to generate tax 
policies for nonprofit hospitals.  Policies based on inaccurate or incomplete information 
related to hospitals’ provision of community benefit measured in terms of quality and 
access could result in unnecessary cost to governments and communities.  Some of the 




comprehensive studies addressing the issue and general disagreement on 
nonprofit hospitals’ roles because policy makers need evidence-based information and 
accepted definitions to craft effective policy in this area (Horwitz, 2003; Horwitz & 
Nichols, 2011).  
 Much of the current literature devoted to differences between for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals focuses on specific indicators unrelated to quality and access. For 
example, Plante (2009) focused on the differences in cash management between the two 
types of hospital while Bazzoli et al. (2010) and Horwitz and Nichols (2011) focused on 
the amount of revenue nonprofit hospitals lose through non-revenue generating 
community activities.  Still others focused on differences in the level of uncompensated 
care provided to patients between the two hospital types (Kim, McCue, & Thompson, 
2009; Principe, Adams, Maynard, & Becker, 2012). 
In addition to the lack of literature related to quality and access, studies in the 
extant literature that do address these indicators, such as Plante (2009), contain sample 
sizes of no more than a few hospitals in well-defined and relatively small geographic 
areas that may or may not be representative of the way hospitals behave across states or 
the country.  Plante (2009) examined differences between the types of patients nonprofit 
and for-profit hospitals treat and the length of time it took to treat them. The results 
indicated no significant difference between the variables used as indicators of patient 
type: case-mix index (p = 2.01); Medicare percentage (p = 2.01); and Medicaid 
percentage (p = 2.02). Similarly, results indicated no significant difference in length of 




Plante used a matched sample of 24 nonprofit and 24 for-profit hospitals located 
exclusively in urban California. 
In 2007, the Senate Finance Committee recommended that Congress should enact 
legislation requiring each nonprofit hospital to dedicate “a minimum of 5% of its annual 
patient operating expenses or revenues to charity care whichever is greater, in accordance 
with its charity care policy” (Staff of Senate Finance Committee--Minority, 100th 
Congress, 2007, p. 7).  Though Congress declined to follow the recommendation, the 
Internal Revenue Service issued regulations requiring nonprofit hospitals to submit 
detailed financial information related to community benefit expenditures starting in 2009 
(Principe et al., 2012).  If based on incomplete information, such changes in requirements 
for nonprofit hospitals could create significant social costs for communities around the 
country that rely on nonprofit hospitals to meet their needs. This study will add to the 
body of literature available to policy makers and hospital administrators to aid them in 
formulating better-informed policies related to the provision of community benefit, as 
measured by quality and access, and the related tax treatment of hospitals. 
Problem Statement 
Policymakers’ continued reliance on incomplete information while making 
decisions related to nonprofit and for-profit hospitals’ tax treatment is a problem among 
hospitals in the United States. Decades of research related to the differences between the 
two hospital types has failed to produce comprehensive evidence that certain hospitals 
deserve the tax exemptions they receive. This problem may be negatively impacting 




through the tax exemptions nonprofits enjoy (Stark, 2011). Alternatively, 
communities may be in danger of losing the community benefit provided by nonprofit 
hospitals through those exemptions (Stark, 2011). A possible cause of this problem is the 
almost exclusive focus on charitable care as a condition for a hospital to maintain 
nonprofit status (Horwitz, 2003; Horwitz & Nichols, 2011) .  The current quantitative 
study researched differences in perceived quality measured in terms of patient 
satisfaction, and access measured in terms of service mix between the two ownership 
forms and brought quality and access, previously understudied but relevant variables, to 
the debate.   
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to seek evidence that 
nonprofit U.S. hospitals provide better quality and access to patients in their communities 
than for-profit hospitals. According to the study’s theoretical framework, stewardship 
theory, organizations in economic relationships with governments will exhibit goal 
congruence with those governments, and thus provide more of what those governments 
desire under certain circumstances.  Puyvelde, Caers, Bois, and Jegers (2012) found 
nonprofit status may be one circumstance under which this goal congruence will exist.    
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The central research question for this study was: What is the likelihood that a 
hospital with a high quality level, as determined by its patient experience of care score, 
and a high access level, as determined by a composite score of its service mix 




§501(c)(3) of the United States Tax Code? The dependent variable was 
ownership structure, either for-profit or nonprofit, and the independent variables were the 
level of quality and the level of access provided.  Based on a review of the literature, I 
proposed the following null hypotheses and hypotheses associated with the research 
question:  
H0: There is no difference in the likelihood that a U.S. hospital with a high quality 
level is classified by the IRS as nonprofit under §501(c)(3) of the United States 
Tax Code versus a U.S. hospital classified by the IRS as for profit. 
H1:  Higher quality levels increase the likelihood that a U.S. hospital is classified 
by the IRS as nonprofit under §501(c)(3) of the United States Tax Code versus a 
U.S. hospital classified by the IRS as for profit. 
H0: There is no difference in the likelihood that a U.S. hospital with a high level 
of access is classified by the IRS as nonprofit under §501(c)(3) of the United 
States Tax Code versus a U.S. hospital classified by the IRS as for profit. 
H1: Higher access levels increase the likelihood that a U.S. hospital is classified 
by the IRS as nonprofit under §501(c)(3) of the United States Tax Code versus a 
U.S. hospital classified by the IRS as for profit. 
Research Objectives 
The objective of this research was to provide information policy makers can use 
when making decisions related to the tax treatment of nonprofit hospitals. It did so by 
determining the extent to which they are better stewards of the public good than their for-




secondary objective of addressing the gap in the literature created by a lack of 
comprehensive study of quality and access among U.S. hospitals.  
Nature of the Study 
This study used a quantitative correlational design using secondary datasets from 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the American Hospital 
Association (AHA) to determine whether quality and access levels are significant 
predictors of ownership structure among U.S. hospitals. These datasets were appropriate 
for this study because they provide yearly measurements from every U.S. hospital that 
receives reimbursements through Medicare and/or Medicaid. Because my dependent 
variable, ownership structure, is categorical, I used logistic regression for the analysis. As 
the terms quality and access are largely subjective and thus difficult to measure, I used 
patient satisfaction and service mix profitability as proxies for them, respectively.  A 
detailed description of my methods is included in Chapter 3.   
Theoretical Framework 
This study relied primarily on Donaldson and Davis’s stewardship theory (as cited 
in Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). In addition, it was informed by alternate 
theories of economic relationships and theories of organizational structure. The following 
sections include a brief review of these theories. 
Stewardship Theory 
 According to stewardship theory, under certain circumstances the entity 
providing a service under a contract, of the steward, will act in the best interest of the 




imposes external controls to force the steward to act in its best interest. Applied 
to this study, each hospital studied was a potential steward and the governments funding 
that hospital through tax benefits and payments under Medicaid and Medicare are the 
principals. According to stewardship theory, under certain circumstances, hospitals will 
do what is in the governments’ best interest regardless of whether those governments 
impose external regulatory controls to force them to do so. Thus, in the same regulatory 
environment, hospitals to which certain circumstances apply will provide more of what is 
in the governments’ best interest than hospitals under other circumstances. According to 
theory in ownership structure, discussed briefly below, one circumstance under which 
hospitals may become stewards and thus provide more of what is in the governments’ 
best interest, is nonprofit status. Governments at all levels in the United States are 
interested in providing quality and access in healthcare so it follows that nonprofit 
hospitals will provide more of those things than hospitals that are for profit. 
Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright (2008) found this holds in certain areas, such as the 
nursing home industry, but not in others, such as job-retraining programs (Heinrich, 
2000). 
Organizational Structure 
Theory related to the for-profit organizational form or ownership structure 
includes several ideas about why hospitals come into being and how they behave. Some 
of the theories used to explain for-profits, or what scholars such as those discussed below 
commonly refer to as theories of the firm date to Coase's (1937) transaction cost theory 




maintaining contracts. These theories, and similar ideas discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2, generally explain firm genesis and behavior as the result of an efficiency 
achieved by the firm that would not be achievable by individuals operating in a market. 
Theories related to nonprofit genesis and behavior, such as Hansmann's (1980) 
often cited contract failure theory, tend to take a different approach.  Hansmann 
explained nonprofit genesis and behavior as the result of a failure of the private or public 
sector to meet people’s needs. Hansmann further asserted that nonprofits’ inability to 
distribute profits to owners makes it possible for donors who need to trust that such 
organizations will expend donations as expected will do so. Similarly, Weisbrod's (1988) 
public goods theory asserts that nonprofits meet the needs of those who demand more of 
a public good or service than the public sector will provide, as does Ben-ner and Van 
Hoomissen’s (1991) theory of organizational choice. 
The theorists mentioned above suggest that for-profit firms behave differently 
than do nonprofit organizations. The former pursues efficiency to maximize value for 
owners while the latter attempts to meet people’s needs. To be sure, these two pursuits 
are not mutually exclusive; however, given a choice between two mutually exclusive 
actions, one of which produced efficiency but did not meet needs, the other of which met 
needs inefficiently, a nonprofit might be more inclined to meet needs inefficiently than a 
for-profit.  For-profits may be less inclined to pursue people’s needs unless doing so also 
results in efficiency, while nonprofits will be willing to meet people’s needs regardless of 




(Coase, 2012; Lozano, 2011) and nonprofits’ interest in filling perceived human 
needs (Valentinov, 2008a).   
Operational Definitions 
As this study used several variables, several operational definitions were 
necessary. As mentioned above, the study employed service mix profitability as a proxy 
for access and patient satisfaction as a proxy for quality. Therefore, the operational 
definitions include: 
 Access: a composite score of the profitability of a hospital’s service offering mix 
identified in the AHA annual hospital survey (Horwitz & Nichols, 2009). Horwitz 
and Nichols assigned hospital services to three categories: relatively profitable, 
relatively unprofitable, and variable. These categorizations were derived from a 
thorough examination of the literature in this area, a review of the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission and Prospective Payment Assessment 
Commission reports to Congress, and interviews with hospital administrators. I 
used these designations to create the composite scores that will serve as a proxy 
for access as discussed in Chapter 2. 
 American Hospital Association (AHA): the national organization that represents 
and serves all types of hospitals, health care networks, and their patients and 
communities. Nearly 5,000 hospitals, health care systems, networks, other 
providers of care and 43,000 individual members come together to form the AHA 




 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS): The federal 
agency operating as part of the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services that administers Medicare and Medicare (CMS, 2014). 
 For-profit hospital: a hospital operating for profit as a sole proprietorship, 
partnership, limited liability partnership, limited partnership, limited liability 
limited partnership, corporation, professional corporation, or limited liability 
company or part of any such an entity that receives funding from through CMS.  
 Internal Revenue Code (IRC): Title 26 of the United States Codes (U.S.C.) which 
contains federal tax law (IRS, 2014). 
 Nonprofit hospital: a hospital operating as a nonprofit, or part of a nonprofit under 
§501(c)(3) of the United States Tax Code that receives funding through the CMS. 
These may include hospitals operated by faith based organizations, charities, and 
quasi-governmental boards and organizations. 
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA): United States Public Law 111–
148 which contains provisions for expanding and regulating health insurance 
coverage (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010). 
 Quality:  The patient experience of care score, a composite of patient satisfaction, 
from CMS’s Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and 
Systems (HCAHPS) survey that CMS uses to determine payment levels under its 
value based purchasing program. The survey contains 32 questions and CMS 
requires hospitals to administer it to a random sample of adults at discharge from 




indicating higher quality. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
calculates this composite patient experience of care score for each participating 
hospital and it represents 30% of a hospital’s total performance score. CMS uses 
the total performance score to determine hospitals’ reimbursement rates (CMS, 
2010). 
Assumptions 
This study relied on several assumptions. The first assumption was that logistic 
regression is the most appropriate methodology for answering the research question. The 
second assumption was that the data collected by CMS and the AHA, was complete and 
accurate, as the data used in the study was secondary data from these sources. The final 
assumption was that the variables used as indicators of quality and accesses are indeed 
indicators of quality and access. Since the data is secondary in nature, gathering the data 
was relatively free of challenges. These data had inherent challenges such as missing data 
points that required review and consideration for exclusion. 
Delimitations 
 This study was delimited in that it only examined hospitals participating in CMS 
Medicare/Medicaid funding program and did not include non-participating private 
hospital structures. This choice allowed a focus on public sector issues such as tax policy 
and publicly-funded healthcare, which are the areas in which I was most interested. 
Limitations 
This study was limited in that, though it provided insight into the relationship 




experimental structure resulted in a restriction on establishing a causal 
relationship between the variables because such designs do not control for threats to 
internal validity.  A true experiment would allow for such control, but creating an 
environment where the only difference between two hospitals is in ownership structure 
would prove impossible, as all of the variables involved in hospital behavior could not be 
successfully identified and controlled for. A quasi-experimental design allowed the most 
feasible control for threats to internal validity as possible for a study of this nature.    
Significance of the Study 
 This study is significant in that it provides policy makers with information that 
will help them to maximize public value.   The study’s results may have found that the 
current balance is appropriate and that revoking or modifying the nonprofit hospital tax 
exemption will result in a loss of the community benefit those hospitals provide. 
Conversely, if one views tax exemptions as payments for services rendered, the results of 
my study might have shown that communities are currently paying hospitals for services 
not rendered and thus not making the most efficient use of resources. 
 Social Change  
The social change implications from this study include the possibility of 
protecting communities from the potential social costs associated with removing or 
restricting nonprofit hospitals’ tax exemption and thereby forcing them to become for-
profit institutions. If nonprofit hospitals are better stewards of the public good, restricting 
their nonprofit status may produce social costs, such as public health issues and other 




costs associated with revenue loss due to patients’ inability to pay for their care. 
Conversely, if nonprofit hospitals are not better stewards of the public good than their 
for-profit counterparts, the potential exists to produce positive social change by removing 
their nonprofit status and thereby removing the payment communities currently make in 
the form of tax exemptions for the perceived benefit nonprofit hospitals provide. The 
potential ability of governments at all levels to shift this currently forgone revenue 
elsewhere could result in increases in funding for social programs in other areas or by 
applying these tax revenue funds towards reduced government debt.  
Summary 
Policy makers need more information if they are to make appropriate policy 
decisions related to the tax treatment of nonprofit hospitals. Though the extant literature 
related to the differences in hospitals with different ownership structures largely indicates 
that there is little difference between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals’ operations, 
relevant questions remain unanswered.   
A quantitative correlational study and data from CMS and AHA collected 
annually from every U.S. hospital was used to determine whether the likelihood that U.S. 
hospitals with high quality access levels are nonprofit versus for-profit. Because my 
dependent variable, ownership structure, was categorical, I used logistic regression to 
infer support for the idea that nonprofit hospitals are better stewards of the public good in 
terms of quality and access than their for-profit counterparts and are thus deserving of the 
tax exemptions they enjoy or not. Donaldson and Davis’s (as cited in Davis et al., 1997) 




and Meckling's (1976) agency theory and organizational ownership theory, 
such as Hansmann (1980) contract failure theory and Ben-ner and Van Hoomissen's 
(1991) theory of organizational choice indicate that they are. If this hypothesis holds, it 
will provide evidence that the tax exemptions nonprofit hospitals receive may be well 
founded. If not, further discussion about whether such hospitals should receive such 
exemptions may be warranted.  
Policy makers, hospital administrators, and communities may be interested in this 
study and its social change implications. Those implications could include the possibility 
of either protecting communities from continuing to needlessly forgo tax revenue through 
the tax exemption or losing community benefit by removing it. This study may allow 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Organization 
This study addressed a problem in the hospital industry whereby policy makers 
are forced to make decisions related to the tax treatment of nonprofit hospitals with 
inadequate information. Literature from several disciplines is relevant to the study. 
Therefore, prior to identifying specific literature, it is appropriate to discuss the various 
relevant areas of study. Clearly, literature related to the differences between nonprofit and 
for-profit hospitals is relevant, as this is the study’s main focus. Such study, however, 
cannot exist separate from a discussion of literature related to the differences between 
nonprofit and for-profit ventures from the economics, management, and organizational 
behavior literature. As one might see broad study of the differences between for-profit 
firms and nonprofit firms as the foundation upon which the study of such firms in 
specific areas, such as the hospital industry, is based, it is appropriate to discuss broad 
ideas about for-profit and nonprofit organizations prior to any discussion of the 
differences between nonprofit and for-profits specific to the hospital industry.  
After examining nonprofit and for-profit firms and discussing relevant theory in 
these areas, I expand on the theoretical framework I used for the study by examining 
literature related to stewardship theory and other economic relationship theories. I then 
discuss the hospital industry in general, including current trends related to services, 
financing, and hospitals’ involvement in economic relationships with governments 
through their status as government contractors. I then discuss the current state of the 




discussion of studies specifically related to the differences between nonprofit 
and for-profit hospitals. Finally, a review of literature related to defining healthcare 
quality and access was performed. 
Identifying Literature 
In order to identify relevant literature, a search was performed in the EBSCOhost 
Political Science Complete and Business Source Complete databases using the search 
terms nonprofit, for-profit, theory of the firm, nonprofit theory, government contracting, 
contracting, agency theory, and stewardship theory. I employed these same search terms 
in a ProQuest search. In addition, I searched the CINHAL with full text and Medline with 
full text databases using the search terms hospitals, for-profit hospitals, nonprofit 
hospitals, quality, access, quality measures, access measures, Medicare, Medicaid, 
Medicare reimbursement, and Medicaid reimbursement. I also used these search terms in 
searchers of the healthcare-related database Cochrane Database of Systemic Reviews.  I 
began my search without including time limitations to assure that I included all relevant 
primary theoretical sources. I then searched for relevant literature published during the 
most recent five years. As a secondary strategy, I mined the reference lists of the relevant 
studies I encountered to further identify relevant literature. 
Dependent Variable: Organizational Structure 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the dependent variable I used for this study was 
organizational form, either for-profit or nonprofit. There is a wide array of literature in 
public administration, economics, organizational behavior, management, and law related 




take. In addition, scholars in this area have developed theories related to the 
market mechanisms leading to organization genesis and the reasons organizations are for-
profit or nonprofit, how and why such organizations emerge in markets, and how they 
behave in those markets. The following sections will include a discussion of the legal and 
theoretical ideas related to for-profit firms and nonprofit organizations and recent 
scholarship related to their behavior. 
What Makes a For-profit Firm? The Law 
Mallor, Barnes, Bowers, and Langvardt (2010) reviewed the usual forms 
businesses take. These include sole proprietorships, partnerships, limited liability 
partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability limited partnerships, corporations, and 
limited liability companies. The following sections will include short synopses of each of 
these forms. 
Sole proprietorships. The most common business form, the sole proprietorship, 
is characterized by a single owner responsible for the firm’s operation. In this business 
form, no separation exists between the owner’s assets and liabilities and the business’s 
assets and liabilities, as for legal purposes, the owner and the business are the same entity 
(Mallor et al., 2010).  
The sole proprietorship is the most common business form because it is the 
default form (Mallor et al., 2010). For example, if one operates a business, but does not 
complete the required legal filings to do so it is treated by the law as a sole 




for business owners who were the sole owners of the business prior to the 
advent of more contemporary business forms.  
Partnerships. Partnerships are characterized by more than one owner responsible 
for the firm’s operation. Each state has its own statutes governing partnership operation, 
but most of them have adopted the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), a model 
partnership statute developed by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws to “codify partnership law in one document, to make the law more nearly consistent 
with itself, and to attain uniformity throughout the country” (Mallor et al., 2010, p. 938). 
According to the RUPA, a partnership is an “association of two or more persons 
to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit” (National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1997, §101(5)).  Owners can create partnerships 
with no formalities and they share the firm’s assets and liabilities. Some partnerships 
operate under a partnership agreement, but the RUPA contains default rules that 
determine the rights of the partners in the absence of such an agreement (National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1997, §103). 
Limited liability partnerships. Limited liability partnerships (LLP) are identical 
to partnerships except that an LLP’s liabilities are largely separate from the partners. In 
the case of wrongdoing on the part of the LLP, for example, the partners are not 
personally liable for damages. Partners continue to be personally liable for their own 
wrongdoing, however (Mallor et al., 2010). 
According to Chrisman (2010), LLPs function in much the same way as limited 




uncorporations arose as a method through which business owners could enjoy 
pass-through taxation and limited liability (Chrisman, 2010). Prior to their emergence, 
business owners had few choices of business form. 
Limited partnerships. Limited partnerships are characterized by two types of 
partners: general partners and limited partners. General partners function in much the 
same way as partners in a partnership. Limited partners, however, have no management 
authority and limited liability. Limited partners generally make a capital contribution to 
the partnership and have a right to its profits (Mallor et al., 2010). 
Chrisman (2010) identified limited partnerships as having developed to address 
the lack of a business form where owners could enjoy both pass-through taxation and 
limited liability.  Since the advent of the limited partnership, other forms have emerged 
that accomplish this as well. These have created competition for partnerships and 
corporations as a business form. 
Limited liability limited partnerships. Limited liability limited partnerships 
(LLLP) are identical to limited partnerships except that in an LLLP, the general partners 
have limited liability. Limited partners also have limited liability. Both function in the 
same way as their counterparts in limited partnerships (Mallor et al., 2010). 
According to Kleinberger (2010), LLLPs grew out of the movement, discussed 
above, to provide a business form that would provide owners with limited liability and 
pass-through taxation. These new business forms add to the competition between 
corporations and general partnerships and uncorporations. States are increasingly passing 




Corporations. Corporations are characterized by the existence of 
shareholders that elect a board of directors to manage their operations. Often, the board of 
directors will select officers to manage the firm. Shareholders have a claim on the 
corporation’s profits, but have no right to manage the corporation. They have limited 
liability for the corporation’s obligations (Mallor et al., 2010). 
According to Chrisman (2010), the corporate form was one of two alternatives 
available for business entities with more than one owner in the United States until the 
middle of the last century. Since that time, the uncorporations have been developed as 
alternatives. The corporation, however, remains the business form of choice for large, 
publicly-traded companies, though Chrisman did postulate that the LLC would make its 
way into that area in the near future. 
Professional corporations. Professional corporations are specifically designed to 
meet the needs of licensed professionals such as physicians. They allow such 
professionals to incorporate their practices. Shareholders must generally hold a license to 
practice the profession in question and, though they have limited liability for the 
corporation’s obligations, they are personally liable to their clients for professional 
malpractice (Mallor et al., 2010). 
Limited liability companies. A limited liability company is owned by members 
who may manage the firm themselves or hire a manager to do so. They enjoy limited 
liability for the firm’s obligations. This form has several tax and management advantages 




The number of limited liability companies in the United States has 
grown significantly in recent years (Chrisman, 2010). Indeed, the LLC is currently the 
most commonly formed business in the country.  Chrisman (2010) saw the evolution of 
the LLC to replace the corporation as the most commonly developed form as a “great 
revolution…in business organizations law” (p. 489) and suggested more research is 
needed in this area.  
What Makes a For-profit? Theory 
In 1937, Ronald Coase asked why firms emerge in markets given that markets are 
considered economically efficient (Lozano, 2011). He proposed transaction cost theory to 
address that question (Coase, 2012) . Transaction cost theory holds that there is a cost 
associated with economic transactions and that pooling resources among economic 
actors, and thus creating a firm, reduces those costs and thus generates more profit than 
the individual actors would on their own. Since then, economists have advanced a 
plethora of theories that explain firm genesis and behavior from various perspectives 
(Lozano, 2011).  
Lozano (2011) grouped theory in this area into four broad categories: (a) 
corporate personality, (b) corporate nature, (c) corporate obligations, and (d) corporate 
management. Corporate personality theories, which, according to Lozano, see the firm as 
a “fictitious entity with the advantage of limited liability” (p.  2), have largely fallen out 
of academic discussion. Corporate nature theories are directly descended from transaction 




detail below, is a form of corporate nature theory. Corporate obligation theories 
see firms as having an obligation to a group or groups.  
Theory in this area receives criticism for its lack of comprehensiveness and 
practical applicability (Lozano, 2011; Zenger, Felin, & Bigelow, 2011). Recent theory of 
the firm literature, such as Lozano's (2011) proposition of a holistic theory of the firm in 
which parts of several previous theories are employed to explain firm behavior and 
Zenger, Felin, and Bigelow's (2011) argument that previous theories complement each 
other attempt to rectify this and provide a comprehensive view of the theory of the firm. 
What Makes a Nonprofit? The Law 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (IRC) exempts the 
following organizations, known in the popular nomenclature as nonprofits, from taxation: 
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, 
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur 
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of 
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or 
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying 
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as 
otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or 




campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public 
office. (Internal Revenue Code of 1986, §501(c)(3)) 
 Though this United States Code (USC) definition of a nonprofit is relatively 
complete, courts regularly hear cases related to whether an organization qualifies as a 
nonprofit (Stark, 2011). Stark (2011) reviewed these legal questions extensively, arguing 
they are related to the nature of a central transaction associated with an organization. 
Such questions, he said, have no definitive answers, as they can be answered differently 
depending on one’s point of view. For example, some view the tax exemption nonprofits 
enjoy as a payment from the government in the form of uncollected taxes on revenue the 
government has the right to tax.  Under this view, the government should require such 
organizations to provide certain services to receive the payment. Conversely, some view 
the tax exemption as nothing more than it is, arguing that because nonprofits do not pay 
dividends to owners or shareholders, they, by definition, do not make a taxable profit. 
Therefore, the government has no right to tax their revenues and by extension, no right to 
require them to provide certain services in exchange for their tax exemption.  Stark’s 
review cited legal precedent supporting both sides of this argument in different situations. 
What Makes a Nonprofit? Theory 
Economists have advanced several theories related to nonprofit genesis and 
operation since the early 1980s.  These generally explain nonprofits from one of two 
perspectives: demand-side and supply-side. The following sections will discuss several 




nonprofit development: trustworthiness theory, public goods theory, the theory 
of organizational choice, and supply-side theory. 
 Trustworthiness theory. Originally termed contract failure theory, Hansmann's 
(1980) trust worthiness theory has come to be associated with the nondistribution 
constraint, or the restriction on nonprofits’ ability to distribute net income, or profit, to 
owners, shareholders, managers and other stakeholders. The theory focuses on 
consumers’ motivations for seeking services from nonprofit organizations as opposed to 
their for-profit counterparts. The nondistribution constraint, Hansmann argued, motivates 
individuals to seek services from nonprofits under certain conditions because it fosters 
trust in such organizations. The theory explains nonprofits as resulting from the failure or 
potential failure of contracts between consumers and for-profit firms under certain 
conditions. The nondistribution constraint is the mechanism through which nonprofits 
address such contract failure. 
Public goods theory. Weisbrod (1988) suggested in public goods theory that 
nonprofit genesis is the result of a shortage of a public good. The public sector, Weisbrod 
argued, will provide enough of a public good to meet the demand of the median voter. 
Some society members, however, will demand more of that good than the median voter 
and will therefore seek an alternative producer.  The private sector will not produce the 
good because the public sector produces it and therefore undermines the market 
mechanism. Therefore, those voters who demand more of the good than the median voter 
will develop a mechanism, in the form of a nonprofit, to produce the required supply of 




 Theory of organizational choice. Ben-Ner and van Hoomissen's 
(1991) theory of organizational choice expands on Wiesbrod’s (1988) contention that the 
public sector will not always meet demand for public goods. Ben-ner and van Hoomissen 
(1991) suggested that when the public sector does not meet demand for public services, 
citizens whose demand has not been met are faced with the choice to either go without 
the service, form a coalition to lobby the government to provide more of the service, or 
form a nonprofit to meet the demand for the service. Nonprofits result when citizens 
choose the third option. Ben-Ner and Van Hoomison argued that nonprofits will emerge 
to provide certain types of goods and services, but not others depending on the degree to 
which those goods and services are trust or collective goods and services, or goods and 
services characterized by nonrivalry, nonexcludability, and asymmetric information. 
 Supply side theory. Trustworthiness theory, public goods theory, and the theory 
of organizational choice are demand side theories in that they explain nonprofits as a 
function of consumers’ demand for public goods and services. The supply side theory, in 
contrast, explains nonprofits as resulting from social or ideological entrepreneurship on 
the part of an individual or group of individuals (Valentinov, 2008b).  Such individuals 
create demand by supplying a good or service that may or may not be provided by the 
market or public sector. 
Theory integration and expansion. According to Valentinov (2008b), demand 
side theorists have traditionally criticized supply side theory for “downplaying the 
significance of the nonprofit organization as an institutional response to imperfections in 




theories of “ignoring the positive identity of nonprofit firms” (p. 759). 
Valentinov (2008b) proposed an integration of such theories using the theory of division 
of labor which asserts that individuals can satisfy their desires through two mechanisms: 
market exchange and self-sufficiency.  When a market failure exists, consumers create 
nonprofits to, in effect, produce services for themselves. This is self-sufficient and 
consistent with demand-side theory. Similarly, social entrepreneurs who develop 
nonprofits seek to provide services themselves because of an internal need to fill a 
perceived social shortcoming, though the provision of such services might be delegated 
to the market. This is self-sufficient and consistent with supply-side theory. Thus, 
Valentinov (2008b) argued, demand and supply-side theories are consistent with each 
other and explain different situations under which nonprofits develop. 
The most recent thought on the nonprofit institutional form centers on the lack of 
comprehensiveness in existing theories (Bushouse, 2011; Valentinov, 2011),  for 
example, Valentinov (2011) used Radhamakal Mukerjee’s assertion in institutional 
theory that nonprofits “adjust the allocation of scarce resource to the patterns of evolving 
broader societal values” and “contribute to the articulation and evolution of the values 
themselves” (p. 614) to inform modern thought on the nonprofit form. This is in contrast 
to previous thought which explains nonprofits as merely a reaction to market and 
government failure. Similarly, Bushouse (2011) used Elinor Ostrom and colleagues’ 
institutional analysis and development framework to argue that differences in for-profit 
and nonprofit genesis and behavior are the result of governance structures in addition to 




Nonprofits in Practice  
The literature contains much recent scholarship describing nonprofits’ practice 
and operation. Some of this literature focuses on nonprofit performance (Carroll & Stater, 
2009; Feeney & Rainey, 2010; Hwang & Powell, 2009; Vaughan, 2010), but much of it 
is related to nonprofits increasing function as government contractors in various 
industries (Ebrahim, 2010; Feiock & Jang, 2009; Kissane, 2010; Krauskopf & Chen, 
2010; Sandfort, 2010; Smith, 2010). This is in addition to studies directly related to 
agency theory and stewardship theory discussed in subsequent sections. 
Nonprofit performance. Nonprofit performance has received attention in the 
recent literature in several ways. Vaughan (2010) addressed performance directly by 
exploring the performance measures contracting public administrators use to assess 
nonprofit contractors and making recommendations for improvement. Other studies 
address performance more indirectly. Carroll and Stater (2009), for example, examined 
revenue stability among nonprofits as a measure of performance and found it to be related 
to diversification and growth.  Other studies related to nonprofit performance include 
Feeney and Rainey's (2010) comparison of public sector and nonprofit organizations 
which found that nonprofits employ fewer bureaucratic personnel policies and regulations 
and are thus less constrained and more efficient in making related decisions. The range of 
performance measures used in these studies and the attention being paid to performance 
measurement in the literature recently has led researchers such as Thomson (2010) to 




current measures are inadequate and inadvertently hinder performance 
(Moxham, 2009) suggesting that further research in this area is needed.  
Nonprofit government contracting. The past few decades have seen increases in 
government contracting largely due to the introduction of new public management 
(NPM), an approach to public administration introduced in the 1970s to provide a 
theoretical framework for governments to function more like private businesses (Lapsley, 
2009). NPM sees contracting as a way to increase government efficiency by adding 
market forces to the provision of public goods and services, thereby reducing the cost of 
providing them. Governments tend to prefer to contract with nonprofits for the provision 
of certain services, such as healthcare and social services (Levin & Tadelis, 2010). As 
such, the research related to contracting relationships between governments and 
nonprofits is centered on such industries. Some studies focus on identifying the 
conditions under which governments choose to contract with nonprofits for the provision 
of such services (Feiock & Jang, 2009). Others focus on the policy implications and 
trends in government funding for services nonprofits provide (Kissane, 2010; Krauskopf 
& Chen, 2010; Sandfort, 2010; Smith, 2010). Some research in this area is focused on 
stewardship theory and agency theory in such relationships and is discussed in the 
following sections. 
Theoretical Framework 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this study relied on stewardship theory, a theory used 
to describe economic relationships, to formulate hypotheses. It was informed by agency 




because private hospitals are either nonprofit or for-profit entities in economic 
relationships with governments in two ways. First, governments either impose or do not 
impose taxes on them, or in some sense, either pay for community benefits hospitals 
provide or do not. Second, governments provide over half of the hospital industry’s 
revenue in the form of payments for services rendered (Barton, 2010).   
The potential issues associated with economic relationships have been apparent 
since Adam Smith, the father of market capitalist economics, wondered in The Wealth of 
Nations whether giving control of companies to parties other than owners would result in 
conflict.  He suggested that managers might not pursue success as rigorously as owners. 
More recently, economists began developing theory about economic transaction costs and 
contracting (Coase, 2012). Stewardship theory and agency theory emerged from this 
literature. The following sections will discuss the two theories beginning with agency 
theory, the earlier of the two. 
Agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) combined ideas about potential 
issues with non-owner management and transaction costs and developed modern agency 
theory.  They viewed firms as legal fictions that are nothing more than a collection of 
contracts under which agents perform duties for principals.  They also asserted that 
agents will act in their economic self-interest due to market-provided incentives 
regardless of whether doing so reduces their firms’ value.  This follows from information 
asymmetry between the principal and the agent; the agent has information the principal 
does not that can be used to either pursue the interests of the principal or not because the 




information asymmetry gives the agent the opportunity to act against the 
principal’s best interests when doing so is in the agent’s best interests. Since Jensen and 
Meckling saw agents as self-interested actors, they argued that agents will always act in 
their own self interests. Thus, they would create a loss of value for principals during 
instances of such goal incongruence.   Jensen and Meckling saw contracts as instruments 
designed to reduce this loss of value or agency costs.  
Scholars have studied agency theory in the context of various types of 
contracting, including contracting between private organizations and government 
agencies (Fernandez, 2009; Lambright, 2009; Marvel & Marvel, 2009). The results have 
been mixed. The theory receives criticism for its contention that people are rational, self-
interested actors (Schillemans, 2013).  Indeed, management theory in psychology, 
sociology, and politics views “the willingness of constituent actors to cooperate toward 
organizational goals as unproblematic” (Donaldson & Barney, 1990, p. 371).  There are 
therefore situations in which managers will act in their principals’ best interests, even 
when doing so is not in their own economic self-interest. This line of reasoning led 
Donaldson and Davis (as cited by Donaldson & Barney, 1990) to develop stewardship 
theory. 
Stewardship theory. Stewardship theory sees contractors as team players who, 
under the right circumstances, will act in the best interest of their principals (Donaldson 
& Barney, 1990).  Donaldson and Davis (as cited in Donaldson & Barney, 1990) 
suggested agents, or what they termed stewards, are good stewards of their principals’ 




argued that these individuals are motivated to pursue organizational, 
collectivistic goals regardless of the opportunity to pursue self-serving activities because 
they place higher level of utility on collectivistic behaviors.  Thus, pursuing the goals of 
the organization maximizes value for both the principal and the steward.  Donaldson and 
Davis saw contracting as a part of an attempt to find an “organizational structure that 
allows coordination to be achieved most effectively” (Donaldson and Barney, 1990, p.  
377). They offered stewardship theory as a tool to broaden economists’ understanding of 
contracting relationships rather than as a replacement for agency theory. 
Stewardship theorists see the choice between principals’ pursuit of stewardship 
rather than agency as a function of risk aversion (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 
1997).  Principals with higher risk aversion will pursue agency contract management 
structures to avoid the risk of incurring agency costs.  Principals with lower risk aversion 
are more likely to pursue stewardship management structures, as they are not as likely to 
wish to avoid the risk of incurring such costs. Thus, stewardship theory complements 
agency theory. 
Recent literature in this area includes study of private sector economic 
relationships with the public sector using stewardship theory (Carman, 2010, 2011; 
Marvel & Marvel, 2009; Schillemans, 2013). Support for the theory in this context has 
been mixed. These results support Donaldson and Barney’s (1990) suggestion that using 
agency theory and stewardship theory may be more or less appropriate depending on the 
situation.  This suggests that future researchers should perhaps focus on identifying 




Some researchers suggest stewardship theory is better applied in 
economic relationships between governments and organizations with certain ownership 
structures.  For example, Puyvelde, Caers, Bois, and Jegers (2012) suggested funding 
relationships with nonprofits might be appropriate for stewardship theory’s application, 
though the literature is “fairly silent on the applicability of stewardship theory to 
nonprofit organizations” (p. 432).  Researchers testing differences between for-profit and 
nonprofit government contractors in different industries through the lens of stewardship 
theory have found mixed support for its application (Amirkhanyan et al., 2008; Heinrich, 
2000; Lambright, 2009). Some of these researchers found results in certain industries 
consistent with the suggestion that it is more applicable to nonprofits and others did not.  
For example, Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright (2008) found that nonprofits achieve 
superior outcomes than nonprofits in the nursing home industry.  They compared both 
nonprofits and for-profits to a comparison group of government facilities and found that 
significantly more medical errors occurred in for profits than in their comparison group 
(p < .05) whereas there was no significant difference between error levels in nonprofits 
and the control group (p > .05).  In contrast, Heinrich (2000) found that for-profit 
providers of job training programs achieved better results than their nonprofit 
counterparts. Heinrich examined the employment status and wages of program 
completers and found that those that had been served by nonprofits had significantly 
higher employment and wages (p < .01). Both Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright (2008) 
and Heinrich (2000) identified a need for further research related to the difference 




Amirkhanyan (2010) and Lambright (2009) found government contract 
administrators and monitors take different approaches to monitoring depending on the 
circumstances. This means they may see different contracting arrangements as either 
consistent with stewardship theory or agency theory and provides further support for the 
need to examine stewardship in different settings. 
Synthesis 
To synthesize the above discussion, one must begin with the regulatory guidance 
for establishing an organization as a for-profit or nonprofit. In doing so, one must 
consider the underlying transactions that create the market incentive for an organization’s 
existence. These may be the basis for an organization to behave as a steward as opposed 
to an agent. In this section I will use the discussion above to identify for-profit and 
nonprofit characteristics and advance hypotheses about their behavior. 
The various theories of the firm discussed above describe firm genesis and 
behavior as a reaction to various market and social forces. Despite the wide range of 
phenomena theorists use to explain firms, there are characteristics they generally agree 
on: firms facilitate transactions to create value. That value exists in the form of profit. 
Thus, I can define a for-profit firm for the purposes of this study as an entity that operates 
for profit organized as one of the legal business forms discussed above. A for-profit 
hospital, therefore, is one that operates in such a way.   
 Theories related to nonprofit genesis and the statutory definition of a nonprofit all 
generally agree on the nondistribution constraint. Thus, one can assert that the 




nonprofit features are not so easily agreed upon, however. For example, 
nonprofit theorists generally agree that a nonprofit will emerge under certain market 
conditions (Ben-ner & van Hoomissen, 1991; Weisbrod, 1988). The legal definition, 
however, does not mention market conditions, but contains several stipulations as to the 
endeavors nonprofits are legally allowed to pursue though no such requirement is 
asserted in any theory. For methodological simplicity, I have decided to define a 
nonprofit hospital as adhering to the legal definition of a nonprofit, but as I demonstrate 
in subsequent sections, the difference between the legal definition and theoretical 
explanations is noteworthy. 
Turning to organizational behavior in the economic relationships between 
governments and hospitals, Puyvelde et al. (2012) suggested that nonprofit contractors, 
and thus nonprofit hospitals, are better stewards of the public good than their for-profit 
counterparts, though the empirical evidence does not support this contention in all 
industries. A thorough examination of many of the theories discussed above provides 
ample support for this conclusion. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested 
that contracts exist to minimize the moral hazard associated with the motivation for 
maximizing one’s value in an economic exchange relationship by taking advantage of 
information asymmetry. Therefore, such motivations increase monetary and social costs 
in the form of increased contract transaction costs—no such motivation exists under the 
nondistribution constraint in a nonprofit, however.  
Davis et al. (1997) outlined several organizational and management structures 




organizations, such as nonprofit hospitals.  Assuming these organizational and 
management structures are present, physicians and hospital employees will act in the best 
interest of their respective organizations, and thereby the best interest of any source of 
contractual organizational funding (Donaldson &Davis, as cited in Donaldson & Barney, 
1990).  Davis, Shoorman, and Donaldson's (1997) more detailed explanation of the 
theory suggests they will do so due to internal control mechanisms.  This is in stark 
contrast to agency theory’s assertion that agents will act in their own economic self-
interest without external controls on their behavior (Jensen &Meckling, 1976).  The 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service’s goal is to increase access to quality 
healthcare for Americans, particularly seniors and the poor, while controlling costs. If 
nonprofit hospitals are stewards of the public good rather than agents, they will exhibit 
measures of quality, access and cost control more consistent with CMS’s goals than those 
among their for-profit counterparts. 
Hospitals’ Relationships with Government 
As mentioned above, private hospitals are government contractors in that over 
half of the procedures they perform are funded through Medicare and Medicaid (Centers 
for Disease Control,  2010). In addition, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
of 2010 (ACA) will likely increase the amount of revenue hospitals receive from 
government agencies (Dorn, Buettgens, Holahan, & Carroll, 2013). Nonprofit hospitals, 
depending on one’s point of view, also receive a payment in the form of tax exemptions 
for the community benefit they provide. Therefore, applying a theoretical framework 




The following sections will explore literature related to hospitals’ relationships 
with government including Medicare and Medicaid, the ACA, and tax exemption, which 
supports this contention. 
Medicare and Medicaid 
Medicare and Medicaid are federally-financed insurance programs designed to 
provide health coverage to populations that would not otherwise be able to afford it, 
namely seniors, the poor, and those who qualify for designated funding programs such as 
hospice and end stage renal disease (ESRD) (Laugesen, 2009). Medicare and Medicaid 
funding arrangements do not represent contracting arrangements in the classical sense, 
but  Cooper (as cited in Collins & Gerber, 2008) suggested that any exchange between a 
funding government and a private provider is similar to a contract for management 
purposes. Thus, hospitals that receive Medicare and Medicaid funding are, for 
management and policy purposes, government contractors. 
Since Medicare’s inception in 1965, Congress has taken several distinct 
approaches to regulating it (Laugesen, 2009).  These began with a system whereby 
physicians set rates for services in their localities through local entities charged with 
administering the programs. Providers took advantage of this ability to essentially control 
reimbursement rates outside of regulatory oversight which led to increased healthcare 
costs.  Congress has attempted to address this issue through a series of regulatory 
approaches with varying degrees of success. According to Laugeson (2009), Congress’s 
first attempt to control costs tied fee increases to physicians’ cost of doing business. 




national spending targets which also failed to control spending. The current 
system is one in which the CMS issues calculated adjustments to reimbursement rates 
yearly, only to have Congress change them under pressure from physician interest groups 
when they are negative. 
The literature related to Medicare and Medicaid contracting focuses on large-scale 
recommendations to address healthcare policy. For example, Jacobs (2007) suggested 
returning to an incremental expansion of Medicare as a method for achieving a national 
health insurance plan, though his article was published prior to the passing of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act that largely accomplishes this.  Tanenbaum (2009) 
extensively reviewed healthcare policy that favors pay-for-performance in Medicare 
reimbursements. She suggested such policies would not be as successful as policy makers 
expect because physicians are indeed motivated to do what is in their economic best 
interest, but they are not motivated to do only that; in certain circumstances they are also 
motivated by nonprice mechanisms.  Stewardship represents a nonprice incentive for 
physicians and other medical professionals to act in the public’s best interest and may 
therefore expand policy makers’ understanding of healthcare contracting. My review of 
the healthcare contracting literature, however, yielded no studies related to stewardship in 
such relationships. 
Medicare legislation exists in four parts: Part A, Part B, Part C, or Medicare 
Advantage, and Part D. Hospitals and some other providers are reimbursed through Part 
A and are incentivized to minimize the cost of care because doing so allows them to 




& Ginsburg, 2012).  Physicians are reimbursed through Part B which 
reimburses them based on the services they provide (Brunt & Jensen, 2010).  This gives 
them an incentive to provide more services and, where possible, higher cost services.  
Part C allows beneficiaries to choose between private health plans. In developing it, 
policy makers attempted to transfer private market efficiencies to the program (Mcguire, 
Newhouse, & Sinaiko, 2011). Part D provides drug coverage to beneficiaries (Kesternich, 
Heiss, McFadden, & Winter, 2013).  
ACA 
Congress passed the ACA in 2010 in an effort to expand health coverage to 
uninsured and underinsured Americans and President Barack Obama signed it into law on 
March 23 of that year.  The legislation includes seven main provisions: 1) Medicaid 
expansion to cover a larger portion of poor, uninsured Americans; 2) a requirement that 
all citizens purchase health insurance or show evidence of insurance coverage through 
other means (eg. Enrollment in employer insurance programs); 3) a provision for the 
development of state-run insurance exchanges through which citizens can purchase 
insurance; 4) a requirement that employers employing more than 50 people provide 
health insurance to their employees; 5) an extension of the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program; 6) tax incentives for businesses employing fewer than 25 people to provide 
health insurance 7) a requirement that insurance companies allow dependents to remain 
on their parents’ plan until the age of 26; and 8) a ban on insurance companies’ practice 
of refusing to cover pre-existing medical conditions (Patient Protection and Affordable 




hundred specific requirements as outlined under the ACA’s 10 titles: 1) 
Quality, Affordable Healthcare for all Americans; 2) The Role of Public Programs; 3) 
Improving the Quality and Efficiency of Healthcare; 4) Prevention of Chronic Disease 
and Improving Public Health 5) Health Care Workforce; 6) Transparency and Program 
Integrity 7) Improving Access to Innovative Medical Therapies; 8) Community Living 
and Support Services Act; 9) Revenue Provisions; and 10) Reauthorization of the Indian 
Health Care Improvement Act (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010). 
Scholars have examined the ACA relatively extensively since its passage. In June 
of 2011, the Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law published a collection of essays 
designed to explore the legislation’s implications (Grogan, 2011a). Some of these 
critiques focused on placing the ACA in its historical and political context (Brasfield, 
2011; Feder, 2011; Gottschalk, 2011; Greer, 2011; Grogan, 2011b; Morgan & Campbel, 
2011; Morone, 2011; Quadagno, 2011; Sparer, 2011). Others focused on cost control and 
regulatory policy issues (Gusmano, 2011; Jost, 2011; Laugesen, 2011; Luft, 2011; 
Oberlander, 2011; Rice, 2011), other substantive issues (Frankford, 2011; Hall, 2011; 
Mechanic, 2011; Miller, 2011; Pollack, 2011) and the impact on existing programs 
(Gitterman & Scott, 2011; Thompson, 2011) associated with the legislation. Still others 
compared the reforms in the ACA to healthcare systems around the world (Marmor, 
2011; Okma, 2011; Tuohy, 2011) and addressed the healthcare reform’s future (Jacobs, 
2011; Jacobson, Napiewocki, & Voigt, 2011; Kersh, 2011; Oliver, 2011; Pauly, 2011; 
Rodwin, 2011). As the ACA was largely unimplemented at the time these scholars 




these essays reflect their expert opinions based on past research and do not 
contain rigorous scientific research. My review of the literature in this area yielded only 
authors’ expert opinions and no rigorous scientific study. Thus, questions related to what 
the ACA will actually accomplish remain largely unanswered. It will suffice to say, 
however, that the legislation represents an intensification of the relationship between 
governments and healthcare providers such as hospitals. 
Tax Exemption 
As mentioned above, the tax exemption nonprofit hospitals enjoy is seen by some 
as a payment of sorts for services nonprofits are seen to render to the government or the 
communities in which they operate.  An exemption on federal income tax for charitable 
endeavors has been a part of U.S. federal tax law since the income tax’s first 
implementation under the Revenue Act of 1861(Botwell, 1863, p.  275) but one can trace 
the philosophical roots of government manipulating charitable giving through tax policy 
through British Common Law of the late 16
th
 and early 17
th
 century (Fishman, 2008) to 
Judeo-Christian scripture (Genesis 47:24-26, American Standard Version). Congress 
legislated the current exemption under the Revenue Act of 1913. Though the exemptions 
differ from state to state, states also exempt nonprofits from income taxes, sales taxes, 
and property taxes (Mikesell, 2009; Walker & Sipult, 2011). 
Outside the debate surrounding nonprofit hospitals’ tax status, there exists debate 
related to the tax exemption for nonprofits in general. Academics such as  Cloverdale 
(2010)  have attempted to explain, if not justify its existence while others have criticized 




in society (Cloverdale, 2010). Critics, such as Malani and Posner (2007) argued 
that the tax exemption such as it is promotes inefficiency in the market. Their argument, 
however, was for extending the exemption to for-profit firms pursuing charitable 
endeavors rather than restricting or eliminating the exemption for nonprofits. .  
Outside of the few aforementioned theoretical works, there is a dearth of literature 
specifically related to tax exemption among nonprofits. I show in a subsequent section 
reviewing more recent literature on the subject, that scholars in this area have focused 
empirical work on comparing the behavior of the two forms rather than the normative 
reasons for tax exemption. Indeed, this is the approach I will take with this study. 
To Tax or Not to Tax Nonprofit Hospitals: The Debate 
One might argue that if a hospital complies with §501(c)(3) of the IRC, it should 
be exempt from federal taxes. There is some debate, however, related to whether some 
nonprofit hospitals meet the IRC requirements. Though one can concretely determine 
whether nonprofit hospitals conform with the nondistribution constraint by examining 
financial records, whether they engage exclusively in one or more of the endeavors listed 
in the IRC is sometimes open to debate. The following sections will provide some history 
on nonprofit hospitals’ status as such and review related literature. 
Charitable Activities 
At first glance, one might argue that no hospital should qualify for nonprofit 
status under the language of the IRC because very few hospitals exist exclusively for any 
of the endeavors the regulation identifies as those that qualify an organization for such 




activity in instances when organizations provide assistance to the poor or 
conduct medical research (United States Government Accountability Office, 2008). Thus, 
hospitals can qualify for the exemption under the IRC if they engage in such activities. 
Community Benefit 
Nonprofit hospitals maintain their exempt status under what is known as the 
community benefit standard (United States Government Accountability Office, 2008). 
The standard is based on an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) revenue ruling requiring 
nonprofit hospitals to provide benefits to their communities (Internal Revenue Service, 
1969). Prior to that ruling, the IRS required nonprofit hospitals to provide charity care to 
the extent that they were financially able to do so (Internal Revenue Service, 1956). 
The IRS identified several characteristics hospitals should demonstrate to 
maintain their tax exempt status (Internal Revenue Service, 1956, 1969). In order to 
qualify as exempt, a hospital must: 1) operate an emergency room open to all members of 
the community regardless of their ability to pay; 2) be controlled by a board of trustees 
composed of civic leaders; 3) make facilities available to all qualified physicians; 4) use 
net revenue to expand facilities, research, or medical training; and 5) offer inpatient 
services to all members of the community regardless of ability to pay (Internal Revenue 
Service, 1956, 1969). These requirements are additional to the nondistribution constraint 
required by the IRC. 
Though the above requirements do not identify the specific nature or amount of 
community benefit nonprofit hospitals should provide, the IRS requires nonprofit 




exempt status using IRS form 990 (United States Government Accountability 
Office, 2008). The United States Government Accountability Office (2008) found that 
there exists wide variation among nonprofit hospitals in how they identify community 
benefit, however. This variation is of concern to policy makers, as it inhibits their ability 
to hold nonprofit hospitals accountable for the provision of community benefit and it has 
created some debate as to what qualifies as such. 
Consensus. There is some consensus among stakeholders as to what qualifies as 
community benefit (Bazzoli et al., 2010; Catholic Health Association (CHA), 2008; 
United States Government Accountability Office, 2008). As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
Catholic Health Association (CHA) and the American Hospital Association (AHA) agree 
that charity care constitutes a community benefit (Catholic Health Association, 2008; 
United States Government Accountability Office, 2008). Indeed, charity care as 
community benefit is consistent with IRS regulations discussed above. These 
stakeholders also agree that the unreimbursed cost of means-tested government health 
programs such as Medicaid qualifies as community benefit. 
Disagreement. The debate related to what constitutes community benefit centers 
around what is known as bad debt. Bad debt results from patients who were not identified 
as qualifying for charity care prior to treatment but, for whatever reason, do not pay 
medical bills or only pay partially. CHA (2008) guidance indicated that hospitals should 
not count bad debt as community benefit, arguing that hospitals should identify patients 
as requiring charity care a priori, thus distinguishing between charity care and bad debt. 




require to identify charity cases prior to treatment. Given the difficulty of doing 
so without such information, bad debt should be counted as community benefit.  
Another area of disagreement between CHA and AHA involves Medicare 
payments. There is often a difference between the amount Medicare will reimburse for a 
procedure and the amount a provider generally charges for the procedure. This difference 
is known as the unreimbursed cost of Medicare. CHA (2008) argued that hospitals should 
not count the unreimbursed cost of Medicare as community benefit because these costs 
are likely to reflect inefficiency in hospital operations. On the other hand, the AHA 
argued that Medicare reimbursements do not always cover their associated procedures’ 
costs. Thus, the difference is community benefit (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2008). 
The Debate and Scholarship 
Given the above discussion, one might expect scholarship in this area to focus on 
community benefit, how it is defined, and how it should be defined. Indeed, several 
recent studies do focus specifically on these issues (Bazzoli et al., 2010; Evans & 
Carlson, 2011; Principe et al., 2012). There is, however, a large and growing body of 
literature that focuses on other aspects of the differences between for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals (Bayindir, 2012; Horwitz & Nichols, 2011; Kramer & Santerre, 2010; Schirra, 
2011). The policy implications of such research are unclear, as only those studies related 
to community benefit as discussed above directly inform policy decisions related to such 
differences. The existence of such research does, however, suggest that scholars consider 




Medicaid indicators of community benefit which implies making tax policy 
decisions based solely on those variables might lead to unforeseen social costs. Horwitz 
(2003) explicitly argued that the, “near exclusive focus on charity care as an acceptable 
justification for tax exemption is too narrow” and that, “policy should reflect the other 
important public benefits disproportionately provided by not-for-profit hospitals” (p. 3). 
In the current study, for example, I considered measures of perceived quality and access 
as indicators of community benefit. These variables are relevant to the debate and may 
offer policymakers insight as they develop policy in this area. This section will include a 
review of literature in this area including the findings of literature comparing the two 
hospital types, and a review of the variables researchers have used to compare them. I 
will then review literature related to the ACA’s impact on the debate. 
Comparison. Rotarius et al. (2005, 2006) and Rosenau and Linder (2003) 
extensively reviewed both the academic and gray literature from the previous two 
decades related to differences between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals and found 
evidence that nonprofits and for-profits were similar in some ways, but not in others. 
Rotarius et al. (2005, 2006) found that in some areas, the literature was inconclusive in 
that some studies indicated differences in a particular area while others did not.  For 
example, they cited Sloan et al. (2001) who found no difference between nonprofits and 
for profits in terms of quality, but also discussed a meta-analysis Devereaux et al. (2002) 
performed that suggested nonprofits achieved higher quality care. Overall, however, 
Rotarius et al. (2005, 2006) found that nonprofit hospitals provide more benefit to their 




different approach and analyzed the literature based on authors’ conclusions. 
They found that out of 149 studies, 59% suggested nonprofit hospitals were superior, 
12% suggested for-profits were superior and 29% suggested there was no difference.  
Based on these findings, they advised caution in considering policies that would 
encourage nonprofit hospitals to convert to for-profit institutions.  
More recent literature related to the two hospital types yielded similar results. 
Some studies indicated no difference in the performance of nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals. For example, Kim et al. (2009) found that ownership type had no relationship 
with the amount of uncompensated care hospitals provide. Others found significant 
differences between hospitals with different ownership types. Bayindir (2012), for 
example, found significant differences between hospitals with different ownership types 
in terms of treatment procedure choices. Still other studies in this area, such as Plante's 
(2009) matched-sample study of urban hospitals in northern California yielded mixed 
results among several variables. 
Variables. Quality is not the only measure arguably not directly related to 
community benefit researchers have used as an indicator of hospital performance. In 
addition to those that used quality to assess performance, Rosenau and Linder (2003) 
identified studies that used access and cost/efficiency to compare hospitals with different 
ownership structures. These were in addition to those studies using measures directly 
related to community benefit: access and amount of charity care provided.  More 
recently, some researchers have turned to service offerings among hospitals of different 




Horwitz and Nichols (2009, 2011) suggested market characteristics are 
also relevant to the discussion Thus, simply studying differences between nonprofit and 
for-profit behavior ignores one relevant factor: the interaction of hospitals with different 
ownership structures in local markets. The results of such research indicate that market 
mix, or the relative numbers of for-profit, nonprofit, and government hospitals in a 
market, affects hospital behavior and therefore removing one type of hospital from the 
mix might have unforeseen social costs. 
My review of the literature in this area yielded no recent scholarship using patient 
satisfaction, or perceived quality, to assess the differences between nonprofit and for 
profit hospitals. Indeed, Rosenau and Linder (2003) deliberately excluded from their 
analysis any study that used such an indicator as a measure of quality citing Landon and 
Epstein's (2001) assessment of the differences between for-profit and nonprofit health 
plans serving Medicaid patients as evidence that the relationship of patient satisfaction to 
quality is uncertain. Landon and Epstein (2001) made no such assertion, however, as their 
study used surveys of plan administrators and did not address patient satisfaction in any 
significant way. I will review the literature related to the connections between patient 
satisfaction and quality in later sections. It will suffice to indicate here that the lack of 
research using this variable represents a gap in the current literature. Also absent from the 
extant literature are studies comparing hospital types using access as a measure of 
community benefit. 
ACA. One cannot participate in the debate in question without considering the 




9007 of the act modifies § 501(c)(3) of the IRC to include a subsection 
requiring nonprofit hospitals to complete a community needs assessment once every three 
years and submit a report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services detailing how 
the hospital in question is providing for any identified needs. In addition, the ACA 
requires that the Secretary of the Treasury compile data related to the indicators of 
nonprofit eligibility discussed above and report them to Congress. What Congress will do 
with this information remains to be seen, but according to Horwitz and Nichols (2009), 
making policy decisions based solely on such information could be counterproductive. 
Principe et al. (2012) addressed another question the ACA raises in this area: will 
the expansion of insurance coverage the act accomplishes and the associated reduction in 
demand for uncompensated care make the nonprofit form obsolete?  They advanced an 
argument that nonprofit hospitals will be better able to pursue real community benefit in 
the form of activities such as service expansions under the ACA, as they will be able to 
shift resources they currently expend on uncompensated care to those areas. Schirra 
(2011) made a similar argument.  
As mentioned above, the actual effects of the ACA remain to be seen. The debate 
related to nonprofit hospitals’ tax exemption is likely to continue unabated regardless of 
these effects. They are likely to influence the debate, however. Therefore, expanding 
academic knowledge related to the differences between the two forms as I propose to do 






Scholars in management and organizational behavior have studied quality 
extensively since the advent of scientific management in the early part of the 20
th
 century. 
Recently, healthcare administrators have applied many of the ideas developed in those 
areas to healthcare. Quality is an ambiguous term in healthcare, however (Shi & Singh, 
2012). The literature in this area is wide and varied, but related articles generally fit into 
two broad categories: developing quality improvement models and measuring quality in 
various settings. Indeed, one must decide what quality means, how to measure it, and 
how to go about addressing areas of concern if one is to effectively improve quality. The 
following will include a discussion of the quality literature in these two areas and, as I 
have chosen to focus on patient satisfaction as an indicator of quality, a review of studies 
specifically related to that variable and a justification of its use. I will start by placing 
current efforts in this area into their historic context and defining healthcare quality. 
Healthcare quality history. As mentioned above, healthcare quality is a largely 
ambiguous topic. To better understand it, one must place current efforts to address quality 
in their historical context. Shi and Singh (2012) provided a detailed history of the U.S. 
healthcare system; unless otherwise indicated, the remainder of this section is a synopsis 
of their review and is attributable to them.  
The healthcare market operated much like any other free market in the pre-
industrial era, from colonial times to the beginning of the 20
th
 century, and prior to 




services and those whose services consumers deemed appropriate and effective, 
or of high quality, succeeded in the marketplace while those whose services consumers 
deemed ineffective, or of low quality, failed. Thus, the market itself regulated and 
encouraged quality. Institutionalized medicine had not yet materialized in the United 
States so barriers to entry in the healthcare market were nonexistent—anyone could 
practice medicine. 
During the post-industrial era, beginning at turn of the 20
th
 century, medicine in 
the United States became more institutionalized. A medical education system developed 
along with standards for practicing medicine, including state licensure requirements for 
physicians. In addition, advances in medical technology created procedures physicians 
could use to treat a wider range of conditions. Many of those procedures, however, 
required facilities more sophisticated than those available in physicians’ private offices. 
Hospitals evolved from the almshouses and pesthouses of the pre-industrial era into 
facilities resembling today’s hospitals to meet this need. These advances led to increased 
healthcare quality. The increasing sophistication in medical care also led to information 
asymmetry, however, or a large difference between the amount of information consumers 
in a market have and the amount of information providers in that market have. Markets 
with high information asymmetry are characterized by an inability among consumers to 
effectively judge the quality of the products and services those markets provide which 





In the 1960s, access to healthcare appeared on the policy agenda.  As 
mentioned above, I will review issues related to access in subsequent sections. I mention 
it here only because government efforts to increase access were largely the impetus for 
today’s quality improvement efforts. In the middle of that decade, Congress developed 
Medicare and Medicaid, discussed in a previous section, to address issues related to 
access and became a payer for health services. The nature of these programs and the 
information asymmetry mentioned above resulted in increases in healthcare spending 
which, by the mid-1990s, led to efforts to reduce costs in the system. Those efforts 
created intuitive concerns that controlling costs would negatively affect quality. Thus, 
quality in healthcare became, and continues to be, a major policy issue. 
Defining quality. A central reason for the ambiguity associated with quality in 
the U.S. healthcare system is the lack of consensus related to what quality is (Shi & 
Singh, 2012). The Institute of Medicine (IOM) (2001), in its seminal report on the quality 
of the U.S. healthcare system, defined quality as “the degree to which health services for 
individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are 
consistent with current professional knowledge” (p. 232). In that report, the IOM outlined 
severe shortcomings in the quality of care the U.S. system delivers and, based on its 
definition, identified six features of a high-quality healthcare system. The Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services subsequently adopted IOM’s suggestions as its quality 
improvement goals. They include creating a system that is safe, effective, efficient, 




The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has taken steps to 
improve these features in the U.S. healthcare system through its quality roadmap which is 
based in part on IOM’s definition of quality and identified features of a quality healthcare 
system (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, n.d.). Of particular interest to the 
current study are CMS’s initiatives to improve patient-centeredness in the system in an 
effort to increase the outcomes desired by those receiving treatment as measured by their 
perceptions of the quality of the care they receive. The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services’ recently implemented value-based purchasing initiative is evidence of 
this. Under this new payment system for hospitals, a portion of reimbursements will be 
based on patient reports of the quality they report their experiences of care. 
Measurement models. Scholars have developed several theoretical models to 
measure quality in the healthcare system.  Donabedian (1966) developed perhaps the -
most well-known model through his critique of the state- of- the- art of study in the 
quality of medical care, asserting that quality is associated with three domains: outcome, 
process, and structure. Outcomes are health services’ final results, processes are the 
technical aspects of the delivery of care such as treatment procedures, and structures are 
the resources available for providing care such as facilities and provider skill level. 
Donabedian suggested that aspects of care do not always fit neatly into a particular 
domain and are often a part of more than one. 
Scholars have augmented Donabedian’s (1966) model in the years since its 
development.  Recent developments in this area include, the collaborative model 




pediatric care and Kaplan, Provost, Froehle, and Margolis's (2012) model for 
understanding success in quality improvement endeavors. These models address the 
ambiguity associated with healthcare quality on some level and attempt to fill gaps in 
prevailing quality assessment approaches.  
Measuring quality. Researchers conducting studies focusing on measuring 
quality in the U.S. healthcare system have used various indicators of quality in different 
settings. Variables, or quality indicators, are often associated with one or more of 
Donabedian’s (1966) domains. For example, Jiang, Lockee, Bass, and Fraser (2009) used 
process of care measures and hospital-level risk-adjusted mortality rates as indicators of 
quality in assessing whether board oversight of quality assurance affects quality levels. 
Clearly, process of care indicators, such as whether heart attack patients receive aspirin 
within 24 hours of admission, are associated with Donabedian's (1966) process domain 
and mortality rates are associated with his outcomes domain. Patient satisfaction, as it 
was used in this study, is associated with both of these domains, as patients experience 
the process of care and the outcomes of that care. 
Patient satisfaction as a measure of quality. As mentioned above, healthcare 
quality had become a major policy issue by the end of the 1990s as a result of the 
perception that controlling costs represented a danger to quality (Shi & Singh, 2012). 
Scholars began focusing on patient perceptions of quality, or patient satisfaction, prior to 
that time, however (Kramer, Fuhrer, Keith, & Materson, 1997).  By the mid-1990s, they 
had published enough literature to support meta-analysis of work involving patient 




received criticism due to methodological issues associated with defining and 
measuring the concept creating the need to develop a model and measurement instrument 
for studying it (Sixma, Kerssens, van Campen, & Peters, 1998). 
More recent patient satisfaction literature is wide and varied and includes 
literature intending to develop and continue to augment current measurement models 
(Hekkert, Cihangir, Kleefstra, van den Berg, & Kool, 2009), literature covering the 
development of instruments for measuring the construct and related constructs (Kim, 
Kim, & Boren, 2008), and studies of the construct’s relationships with process, structure, 
and outcome variables associated with the healthcare system (Boulding, Glickman, 
Manary, Schulman, & Staelin, 2011; Isaac, Zaslavsky, Cleary, & Landon, 2010; Moore, 
McMullen, Woolford, & Berger, 2010; Otani, Waterman, Faulkner, Boslaugh, & 
Dunagan, 2010), particular demographic and social groups (Brooks-Carthon, Kutney-
Lee, Sloane, Cimiotti, & Aiken, 2011; O’Brien & Shea, 2011), and patients with 
particular conditions (Kaplan et al., 2012; Lis, Rodeghier, Grutsch, & Gupta, 2009). In 
addition, there exists literature describing the importance of tracking patient satisfaction 
and how providers can apply patient satisfaction measures to quality assurance and 
improvement efforts (Cliff, 2012; Levoy, 2012). 
There is some debate related to whether patient satisfaction is an appropriate 
indicator of quality in the healthcare system. Tzeng and Yin (2008), for example, argued 
that there are significant differences between quality and patient satisfaction and that in 
some cases, pursuing patient satisfaction in the face of limited resources will harm the 




appropriateness of using patient satisfaction as an indicator of quality. The 
reality in the field, however, is that it is used as an indicator of quality, though not the 
only indicator. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, for example, considers 
patient satisfaction a relevant variable in determining reimbursement rates for hospitals 
(Satisfaction data zeros in on areas to improve, 2010) and hospitals ignore patient 
perceptions of the quality of care at their own peril, as healthcare consumers could pursue 
care elsewhere, thus negatively affecting those hospitals’ revenue. In addition, Isaac, 
Zaslavsky, Cleary, and Landon (2010) found  evidence that patient satisfaction is 
positively correlated with objective technical quality measures across a range of services 
provided (r = 0.15 to 0.63; p < .05 for the range), though it is broader in its scope than 
such measures. Patient satisfaction may therefore provide more comprehensive results 
than other quality measures. Thus, I find that regardless of the debate related to its 
appropriateness, patient satisfaction is a relevant subject of study. 
Though I found no reference to it in the literature, it seems that one might also 
argue that patient satisfaction is irrelevant to the current question in light of the above 
discussion related to community benefit. I would counter, however, that if there is a 
difference between patient satisfaction associated with for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, 
that difference could be considered community benefit, as the community pays no more 
for the extra satisfaction and any member of that community is equally entitled to it. This 
argument is in addition to the broader sense of community benefit discussed above some 
scholars employ that supports the view of patient satisfaction as community benefit, or at 





Like quality, access is a largely ambiguous term in U.S. healthcare. It is, however, 
one of the “three major cornerstones of healthcare delivery” (Shi & Singh, 2012, p. 472). 
Access is an issue that is somewhat unique to healthcare, though some social scientists 
study it as an issue in social policy. For example, scholars have addressed issues like 
equal access to government services. In private markets, however, access has received 
significantly more attention in healthcare than in industries producing other goods and 
services. Indeed, access to healthcare is a more significant social issue than is access to 
consumer goods like cars or television sets—one can live without the latter, but often 
cannot without the former. The literature in this area is not as wide and varied as the 
literature related to quality, but like that literature, articles related to access generally 
either attempt to develop or augment conceptual models or to measure access in different 
settings. In the following sections I will review this literature, discuss common access 
measures, and provide a justification for my choice of service availability as an indicator 
of access. Prior to doing so, however, I will discuss the definition of access and place the 
concept into its historical context.  
 Defining access. Prior to placing access into its historical context, one must reach 
a definition of the term. Shi and Singh (2012) defined healthcare access as the “ability of 
a person to obtain healthcare services when needed” (p. 493). The ability to obtain care 
when needed is affected by several variables that include, but are not limited to whether a 
person can afford care, whether that person has an accessible source of care, and whether 




of access depending on the conceptual model through which one chooses to 
view it, but Shi and Singh’s definition reflects the basic idea behind access and is thus 
appropriate for use in this study. I will discuss the variations in the definition among 
conceptual models below. 
 A short history of access in healthcare. During the pre-industrial era, the market 
drove access to healthcare (Shi & Singh, 2012). Those who could afford medical care 
received it. Those who could not either went without treatment or received treatment 
through civil society. For example, the indigent often received care from the precursors to 
modern hospitals: charitable pesthouses and almshouses. 
As mentioned above, access to healthcare became a major public policy issue in 
the mid-1960s after the federal government became a major payer for health services. 
Prior to that time, utilization in healthcare had been on the rise, which coincided with the 
developments in the healthcare market discussed above (Andersen , 1968). As medical 
care became more sophisticated, for example, consumers placed more trust in the 
healthcare delivery system’s ability to effectively treat illness and were thus more likely 
to use the system. The increased utilization represented an increase in access, as it 
removed a barrier from people’s ability to obtain needed care: the belief that the care is 
unlikely to resolve their health issues. In addition, the health insurance market developed 
during the early part of the industrial era which removed financial barriers to receiving 
care (Shi & Singh, 2012). 
Utilization statistics published over the course of the post-industrial age reflect 




cited in Andersen, 1968) found that less than 50% of people saw a doctor over 
the course of a year. By 2010, 80% of Americans came into contact with a medical 
professional at least once (Schiller, Lucas, Ward, & Peregoy, 2010). Of note is that these 
statistics reflect disparities between utilization rates among minorities and Whites and 
those of low socioeconomic status and the affluent and continue to do so. This suggests 
that some Americans encounter more barriers to access than do others.   
 Access models.  Andersen (1968) developed the first and most widely-used 
conceptual model of access. He proposed that access among families was the result of a 
confluence of factors which included a family’s level of predisposition for obtaining 
medical care, the number and level of enabling conditions present, and the perceived 
need for such care. A predisposition for obtaining medical care, Anderson explained, is 
the result of a belief that medical care will be effective, the social structure of the family 
and its other characteristics. Enabling factors include family and community resources 
and need includes the presence of illness and the family’s response to that illness. 
Andersen (1978) argued that access could be made equitable by manipulating 
predisposing and enabling factors to ensure that medical care is distributed according to 
need. 
Since its original development, scholars have augmented the Anderson model 
several times. According to Shi and Singh (2012), for example, Aday and Andersen 
refined it in 1975 and Aday and colleagues expanded it to address the role of public 
policy in the framework in 1980. Andersen (1995) traced this evolution of the model 




(b) phase two included the addition of public health policy, (c) phase three 
acknowledged the relevance of population health in the model, and (d) phase four 
recognized the, “dynamic and recursive nature of a health services' use model which 
includes health status outcomes” (p. 7). Andersen (2008) added a fifth phase to the 
model, developed during the 2000s, that recognizes the role of contextual determinants of 
access to care. More recent research appears to fit into this phase, as scholars attempt to 
incorporate changes in the health services delivery system into research in this area. 
Though it is the most widely-used model, Anderson’s (1968) is not the only 
access model scholars have developed. Ricketts and Goldsmith (2005) discussed and 
reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of the two most popular models. The Anderson 
model was, of course, included in their discussion but so was the later Penchansky and 
Thomas model which viewed access as a function of how well the health services system 
fits patients’ needs.  Penchansky and Thomas (1981) viewed access as a function of five 
dimensions of fit between the patient and the health services system: (a) availability, (b) 
accessibility, (c) accommodation, (d) affordability, and (e) acceptability. They defined 
each of these domains in terms of a relationship: (a) availability is the relationship 
between a patient’s needs and the supply of health services available to meet them; (b) 
accessibility is the relationship between the location of the available resources and the 
patient’s location; (c) accommodation is the relationship between the way the health 
delivery system is organized and the patient’s ability to navigate through it as such; (d) 
affordability is the relationship between service prices, third-party payer involvement and 




and (e) acceptability is the relationship between client attitudes about provider 
characteristics and those providers’ actual characteristics and the relationship between 
providers’ attitudes about patient characteristics and their patient’s actual characteristics. 
Access measures. Access measures have evolved with the evolution of access 
models. Andersen (1968) first measured access in terms of utilization. Indeed, if one 
views access according to the original Anderson model, those who use the health services 
delivery system have access to the service and those who do not use the health services 
have no access to the services. During phase two of the Anderson model, scholars added 
patient satisfaction as an indicator of access (Andersen, 2008) and measured it in terms of 
process and outcome indicators much like those studied in the quality literature 
(Andersen, 1978). As mentioned above, Andersen (1978) viewed equitable access as the 
distribution of medical care according to need; he developed indexes for measuring 
access as such during phase two. Phase three saw the addition of health status indicators 
as access measures and phase four saw the inclusion of outcomes of health service use as 
determinants of enabling factors and thus indicators of access. Phase five, the current 
phase, adds study of aggregate contextual factors such as health organization and 
provider characteristics as indicators of access (Andersen & Davidson, 2011). 
Access indicators, in the current model, are divided into categories of factors as 
they were in the original model: (a) predisposing characteristics, (b) enabling 
characteristics, and (c) need characteristics. In addition, indicators from subsequent 
phases of the model such as health behaviors and outcomes are included. Finally, the 




Service offering mix as a measure of access. Clearly, access is a 
complex concept consisting of many variables. As this is a study of the access provided 
by U.S. hospitals, it is appropriate to narrow the access indicator evaluated to one over 
which hospitals have control, such as which services they provide. This is consistent with 
phase five of the model which, as discussed above, includes service provider 
characteristics. Though it is an incomplete measure of access for any individual consumer 
or group of consumers, service offering mix does provide an indicator of any given 
hospital’s contribution to the community in terms of access. As such, several previous 
researchers used it in similar capacities. 
Summary 
The above discussion indicates that there is indeed a need for further research in 
this area. The question of whether non-profit hospitals do anything to earn tax 
exemptions that their for-profit counterparts do not do is far from answered. Relevant 
theory in this area suggests that there is a difference between the way non-profits and for-
profits behave and previous research provides support for this contention in some 
industries. Thus, the independent variable in this study is appropriate, yet the hospital 
industry has yet to be studied extensively from this perspective. 
The dependent variables are appropriate for several reasons. First, CMS, the 
agency that regulates government-funded hospitals, is interested in quality and access. 
Second, recent scholarship suggests the specific indicators the study will use for these 
variables, patient satisfaction and service offering mix, are indicators in which policy 




variables are or should be related to the community benefit standard the IRS 
uses to determine whether a hospital qualifies for tax exemption under the IRC. The 
study proposed here will examine these understudied variables using the methods 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the purpose of this study was to seek evidence that 
nonprofit U.S. hospitals provide better quality and access to patients in their communities 
than for-profit U.S. hospitals. A correlational design is appropriate for this study despite 
its limitations for reasons discussed in subsequent sections. I also discuss my proposed 
methodology, including a discussion of the population I studied, how I sampled that 
population, and the variables examined. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of 
threats to validity present in the study and a summary.  
Research Design and Rationale 
The current study sought to determine whether ownership structure, the 
independent variable, is more likely when higher levels of two dependent variables are 
present: quality measured in terms of patient satisfaction, and access measured in terms 
of hospital service mix profitability.  A correlational design is appropriate for this study 
for reasons outlined in this section.  
According to Campbell and Stanley (1963), studies like the one proposed here are 
weak in that they suffer from threats to internal validity to the extent that researchers are 
unable to use them to establish causality. Despite this limitation, the design is appropriate 
here, as the research question associated with this study asks whether a correlation exists 
between ownership structure and quality and access rather than whether ownership 
structure of any particular type causes differences in hospital behavior directly. Indeed, 




difference in behavior between the two forms, if there is one, but they can 
proceed without evidence that the difference is directly attributable to ownership 
structure.  For example, nurses of a certain mindset might be attracted to nonprofit work 
and that attraction might be responsible for a correlation between ownership structure and 
quality, but that is of no consequence to tax policy; if the public receives a benefit 
because it allows for nonprofit hospitals, then it receives a benefit regardless of whether 
ownership structure itself or the mindset of nurses attracted to certain work environments 
actually caused the benefit to occur. 
The chosen design made the research feasible in light of the resource limitations 
present. A more rigorous quasi-experimental design could be used to address the research 
question and suffer from fewer threats to internal validity, but time and resource 
considerations precluded the researcher from performing such a study given that the 
added resource expenditure would result in little added value. This is true because the 
research question seeks prediction, as measured by resulting Odds Ratios of the logistic 
regression models, rather than causation. Despite the mentioned weaknesses associated 
with the design, this study is not alone in the literature on this subject. Indeed, the two 
studies upon which this study design is based both used similar designs (Amirkhanyan et 
al., 2008; Horwitz & Nichols, 2011). According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 
(2008), such studies are appropriate in the social sciences under certain circumstances 
and the literature in this area is teeming with examples of studies employing the 
techniques proposed here. This suggests that researchers in this area find value in such 





As mentioned above, the current correlational study examined secondary data 
related to U.S. hospitals’ patient satisfaction levels and service mix. It sought to 
determine whether high levels of these variables increase the likelihood that a hospital 
will be nonprofit versus for-profit.. This section describes the methods I used to 
determine whether such an increase in likelihood exists. 
Population 
The population this study examined included all private, for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals operating in the United States that receive payments from the state or federal 
government in the form of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements. It did not include 
government-run hospitals such as those operated by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, 
Department of Defense, or the Bureau of Federal Prisons due to their organizational 
structure and reimbursement forms differing from public-accessible hospitals.  It did 
include quasi-governmental hospitals operating under IRC section 501(c)3 that receive 
government payments and tax exemptions. These population parameters allowed me to 
appropriately apply my theoretical framework, as each of these hospitals is in a clear 
economic relationship with the public and is thus either an agent or a steward of the 
public good. This is true, as all of the hospitals in the population receive government 
payments for services rendered. The nonprofits in the population also receive payments 




Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
According to the AHA, there are currently over 6,500 hospitals in the United 
States. The population for this study included all hospitals reported in the AHA database 
where there is corresponding CMS cost and quality report data available.  
Data Collection 
The data used in this analysis came from CMS’s Hospital Consumer Assessment 
of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey and AHA’s annual hospital 
survey. This section will detail how these data were collected from the originating 
database holder and how it was acquired for the study. 
HCAHPS 
In 2008, CMS began administering the yearly Hospital Consumer Assessment of 
Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAPS) (CMS, 2010). The agency’s goals 
administering the survey include collecting and disseminating data related to patient 
perceptions of care. The survey contains 32 questions and CMS requires hospitals to 
administer it to a random sample of adults at discharge from a wide array of medical 
services. This study will use these data from the HCAPS survey for univariate and 
multivariate analyses.  
Annual Hospital Survey 
The access data analyzed in this study will be secondary data collected by the 
AHA. According to the AHA (2012), it surveys 6,500 U.S. hospitals each year, including 
the hospitals of interest in this study, with a 70% response rate. Researchers consider this 





This study sought to determine whether the amount of satisfaction a hospital’s 
patients report and the profitability of its service mix are good predictors of a hospital’s 
ownership structure. To accomplish this, I viewed patient satisfaction and service mix 
profitability as predictor variables, or independent variables, and ownership structure as 
the dependent variable. As the dependent variable is categorical, I used logistic regression 
to determine whether higher levels of the dependent variables present increases the 
likelihood independent variable was in a particular category. The following sections 
provide details on variables and data analysis.  
Operationalization. Chapter one contains operational definitions for the 
variables under examination in this study. Table 1 identifies these predictor and outcome 
variables, their data level, and the chosen test statistic. 
 
Table 1                    
Variables and Test Statistic 
 Variable Name Data Level 
Predictor Variable 1 Quality Ratio 
Predictor Variable 2 Access Ratio 
Outcome Variable Ownership Structure Nominal 
Test Statistic: Odds Ratio Calculated using Logistic Regression 
 
Data analysis plan. As mentioned in Chapter One, I analyzed the variables using 




categorical.  According to Field (2009), logistic regression is appropriate for 
determining whether one or more independent variables accurately predicts a categorical 
dependent variable.  I will use the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to 
conduct the analysis. 
The central research question for this study was: What is the likelihood that a 
hospital with a high quality level, as determined by its patient experience of care score, 
and a high access level, as determined by a composite score of its service mix 
profitability, is nonprofit versus for-profit according to IRS classification under 
§501(c)(3) of the United States Tax Code? The dependent variable was ownership 
structure, either for-profit or nonprofit, and the independent variables were the level of 
quality and the level of access provided. I tested the following null hypotheses and 
hypotheses associated with the research question:  
H0: There is no difference in the likelihood that a U.S. hospital with a high quality 
level is classified by the IRS as nonprofit under §501(c)(3) of the United States 
Tax Code versus a U.S. hospital classified by the IRS as for profit. 
H1:  Higher quality levels increase the likelihood that a US hospital is classified 
by the IRS as nonprofit under §501(c)(3) of the United States Tax Code versus a 
U.S. hospital classified by the IRS as for profit. 
H0: There is no difference in the likelihood that a U.S. hospital with a high level 
of access is classified by the IRS as nonprofit under §501(c)(3) of the United 




H1: Higher quality levels increase the likelihood that a U.S. hospital is 
classified by the IRS as nonprofit under §501(c)(3) of the United States Tax Code 
versus a U.S. hospital classified by the IRS as for profit. 
I obtained the necessary data from CMS and the AHA through their respective 
websites. The CMS data required are available for download from 
https://data.medicare.gov/data/hospital-compare. The patient experience of care score of 
interest in this study ranges from 0 – 100 and is available for each participating hospital. 
Higher scores are associated with higher perceived quality levels. The AHA data is 
available for purchase through http://www.ahadataviewer.com/book-cd-products/aha-
guide/. The data identifies each responding hospital by ownership structure, thus 
providing the dependent variable. It also lists the services offered by each hospital from 
which I will calculate service mix profitability. 
I developed the composite score for service mix profitability for each hospital 
using Horwitz and Nichols's (2009) determinations of service profitability. They 
identified the hospital services listed as available at a hospital or not in the AHA data as 
relatively profitable, relatively unprofitable, variably profitable, or of unknown 
profitability. To develop the composite score for each hospital, I planned to assign a 2 to 
relatively profitable services it offers and a 1 to relatively unprofitable services, variably 
profitable services and services of unknown profitability it offers. The sum of these 
scores for each hospital was to represent its composite score of service mix profitability.  
I then conducted a binary logistic regression analysis to determine the likelihood 




mix is nonprofit. As indicated above, logistic regression was necessary, as one 
of the variables included in the data set is categorical in nature. The logistic regression 




   
Where e is the base of natural logarithms, b0 is the Y intercept, b1 is the regression 
coefficient associated with Q, Q is the level of perceived quality as indicated by patient 
experience of care composite score, b2 is the regression coefficient associated with A, and 
A is the level of access as indicated by the composite service mix profitability score.   
Using SPSS vs. 21, I used the entry method of logistic regression, as it is 
appropriate for testing a theory (Field, 2009) and there is no reason indicated in previous 
research to use the stepwise method and risk suppressor effects. Though as expected, data 
from CMS and AHA was screened and clean, I chose a discrete value for missing data 
that does not correspond to any value that naturally occurs in the data and use the missing 
data feature to leave the missing data I do expect out of the analysis. 
In Chapter 4 I reported the beta value, its standard error and p value for each 
predictor variable. In addition, I reported the odds ratio and its confidence interval. Using 
these statistics, I rejected the null hypothesis and inferred support for my research 
hypotheses. 
After reporting the results of the analysis, I assessed the regression model. 
According to Field (2009), logistic regression must meet several assumptions.  Linearity 
is assumed in the relationship between the predictors and the dependent variable using 




observations are assumed to be independent, and multicollinearity is assumed 
to be absent among the predictors (Field, 2009). According to Field (2009), incomplete 
information from the predictors, complete separation, and overdispersion in the data can 
also cause problems. 
I used SPSS to assess how well the data fits the model. First, I examined a 
classification plot I generated using SPSS.  In such plots, if the cases are clearly clustered 
on one side of the graph, it will indicate the data is a good fit for the model.  I present the 
classification plot in an appendix along with all other outputs and syntax. Next, I 
examined the residuals. Assuming the model fits the data, I will expected around 5% of 
the cases in the data to have standardized residuals that exceed ±2. I examined the Cook’s 
Distance associated with cases with standardized residuals greater than 3 to determine 
whether they had an undue influence over the model. Overall, these indicators gave an 
indication of whether the data was a good fit for the model. 
Next, I tested the model’s generalizability.  I tested the linearity of the 
relationship between the predictors and the logit of the dependent variable by creating 
predictor variables that are the interaction of the predictor and its logit as Field (2009) 
described. An interaction between either of the predictor variables and its logit being 
significant indicated that the assumption had been violated. I then tested the 
multicollinearity assumption by using SPSS to run a linear regression to produce 
collinearity diagnostics as Field (2009) suggested. Values within the limits Menard (as 
cited in Field, 2009) and Myers (as cited in Field, 2009) suggested as respective 




addition, I examined the condition index values to determine whether any one 
was significantly larger than the others and the variance proportions to determine whether 
a collinearity issue existed. 
Threats to Validity 
As previously discussed, the study design itself suffers from several threats to 
internal and external validity.  Campbell and Stanley (1963) discussed eight common 
threats to internal validity: (a) history, (b) maturation, (c) testing, (d) instrumentation, (e) 
statistical regression, (f) selection, (g) experimental mortality, and (h) selection-
maturation interaction. They also discussed several threats to external validity: (a) 
reactive or interaction effect of testing, (b) interaction effects of selection biases and the 
experimental variable, (c) reactive effects of experimental arrangements, and (d)  
multiple treatment interference. This section will discuss these threats to validity as they 
relate to this study. 
Several of the threats to internal validity are irrelevant to this study. For example, 
threats associated with time, such as those associated with history and maturation are of 
no concern in a study employing data collected at one time from among subjects. The 
threats to internal validity that were of concern in this study are associated with selection. 
Specifically, I had no control over group assignment or the interaction of potentially 
confounding variables that may account for the variation in my dependent variable. 
Logistic regression allowed me to determine whether there is a relationship between the 





There was little need to establish causality in this study. This study 
sought to determine whether the likelihood that U.S. hospitals with high quality access 
levels are nonprofit versus for-profit so that policy makers can make better informed 
decisions about their tax treatment.  If such a relationship exists between these two 
variables, policy makers will need further information and research attempting to 
establish causality will be warranted. This study represents a mere first step in this 
process. 
Having addressed threats to internal validity, I will now address threats to external 
validity. The only potential threat to external validity relevant to this study is the possible 
effect of the interaction between selection and the dependent variables. Given this 
potential interaction, it is not possible to make a generalization that any observed 
difference in a sample is applicable to the entire population from which the sample was 
drawn. In this study, however, the sample included the entire population rendering any 
threat to external validity irrelevant.  
Ethical Procedures 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and the AHA both take steps to 
ensure that the data they collect are collected according to certain ethical procedures.  
Since those organizations collect the data examined in this study, it is incumbent upon 
this researcher to examine those procedures prior to performing the analysis to ensure 
that they meet Walden University’s ethical requirements. This section will include a 




The HCAHPS survey results are a matter of public record and can be 
downloaded at the CMS Hospital Compare website: 
https://data.medicare.gov/data/hospital-compare  Though the data are collected at an 
individual level, the datasets CMS maintains are aggregated at the hospital level and no 
personally identifiable information on any individual respondent is included. Therefore, 
ethical concerns related to respondent privacy do not exist. Hospitals are required, as part 
of their payment agreement with CMS to provide this information to the agency with the 
understanding that it will be publicly released. Therefore, ethical concerns related to 
hospital organizational privacy do not exist either. 
Participation in the annual AHA survey is voluntary. The association sends the 
survey instrument to targeted respondents, usually facilities’ Chief Executive Officers, 
with information related to how the information will be used and how and to whom it will 
be released. The American Hospital Association validates the data, packages it, and 
prepares it for use. There are no ethical concerns associated with using the data, as it is 
collected, owned and released by AHA which seeks informed consent from respondents. 
Summary 
This study used a correlational design to determine whether high quality and 
access levels among U.S. hospitals increase the likelihood that they are nonprofit. Quality 
was measured in terms of patient satisfaction and access was measured in terms of 
service mix profitability. The data required was acquired from secondary datasets 
collected by CMS and AHA, which minimizes ethical concerns related to data collection. 




of interest exists. This study design suffers from threats to internal validity to 
the extent that it will not establish causality. That is not the focus or intent of the study, 






  Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
The purpose of this correlational study was to seek evidence that nonprofit U.S. 
hospitals provide better quality and access to patients in their communities than for-profit 
hospitals. To that end, the associated research question was: what is the likelihood that a 
hospital with a high quality level, as determined by its patient experience of care score, 
and a high access level, as determined by a composite score of its service mix 
profitability, is nonprofit versus for-profit according to IRS classification under 
§501(c)(3) of the United States Tax Code? The theoretical framework associated with the 
study, stewardship theory, led to hypotheses indicating that hospitals that provide higher 
levels of quality and access are indeed more likely to be nonprofit than for-profit 
institutions. This chapter will discuss the data collection and results associated with the 
study.  
Data Collection 
Two entities provided the administrative data analyzed for this study: Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and The American Hospital Association (AHA). 
The CMS data, downloaded on December 9, 2014, is publicly available for download at 
https://data.medicare.gov/data/hospital-compare and, at the time of the download, was the 
most recent data available. It identifies the ownership structure of each U.S. hospital of 
interest, the dependent variable of interest in the study, and includes the patient 
experience of care score for 2013, one of the independent variables of interest in the 




value based purchasing program. The data downloaded from CMS included 
patient experience of care scores in an appropriate format for use in the study; the data 
required no further manipulation. 
The CMS data provided for the creation of a list of hospitals of interest that AHA 
used to compile a file identifying service offerings by hospital. I received the data file 
through e-mail under a licensing agreement on February 2, 2015. The data included data 
from the 2013 AHA survey, the most recent year available. The AHA data allowed me to 
compute the second independent variable of interest in the study, service mix profitability 
index scores, for the hospitals under examination using Horwitz and Nichols’s (2009) 
determinations of service profitability. I assigned a 1 to cases where a hospital did not 
offer the identified service and services of unknown profitability, a 2 to relatively 
unprofitable services, and a 3 to relatively profitable services. The mean of all 
profitability scores for each hospital served as the index score for service mix 
profitability in the study. This computation method was a departure from the planned 
methodology described in Chapter 3 in the two ways described below.  
First, as explained above, I assigned a 2 only to those services that are relatively 
unprofitable. This resulted in a more accurate representation of the service mix 
profitability of each hospital, as a hospital may have chosen a service designated as of 
unknown profitability or variable profitability in the research because it was known by 
that hospital to be profitable in its particular situation. The assignment of a 2 in such a 




The second departure from the original methodology was that rather 
than take the sum of the profitability scores that a hospital provides, I used the mean of 
the profitability scores a hospital provides. This provided for a more accurate comparison 
of hospitals because a hospital may have chosen to provide a single service because it is 
profitable. Therefore, that hospital’s service mix is profitable. Another hospital may have 
chosen several unprofitable services in an effort to expand access. Therefore, its service 
mix is unprofitable. Taking the sum of the of the two as an indicator of service mix 
profitability, however, would indicate that the unprofitable hospital had a more profitable 
service mix than the profitable hospital because it offers more services. Conversely, the 
mean correctly identifies the hospitals as unprofitable and profitable, assigning them an 
index score of 2 and 3, respectively. Baseline descriptive statistics of the sample, 
including these changes, are displayed in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Hospital Ownership 2701     
Patient Experience of Care Score 2701 .9 29.7 12.16 5.41 
Service Profitability Index Score 2305 1.08 2.53 1.81 .258 
Sample Size 
In the case of this study, the sample included all 2701 U.S. hospitals that receive 
funding through CMS; this is the entire population of interest. The CMS data was 
complete; the AHA data included 396 cases for which the services offered were 
unidentified. Because the sample included the entire population, the issues related to 
potential violations of the assumptions associated with logistic regression are of little 




from one’s data even if assumptions have been violated. Assumption violations 
merely restrict one’s ability to generalize conclusions drawn from a sample to the entire 
population associated with that sample. Since the sample here includes the entire 
population, I can do so regardless of whether the model violates assumptions.  
Results 
I conducted binary logistic regression analyses to assess how well levels of 
quality and access predict ownership structure, creating a separate model for each 
independent variable. The results of my analysis allowed me to address my research 
question: What is the likelihood that a hospital with a high quality level, as determined by 
its patient experience of care score, and a high access level, as determined by a composite 
score of its service mix profitability, is nonprofit versus for-profit according to IRS 
classification under §501(c)(3) of the United States Tax Code?  
Through my review of the literature, I proposed two sets of null hypotheses and 
research hypotheses to address the research question. The first of these was: 
H0: There is no difference in the likelihood that a U.S. hospital with a high quality 
level is classified by the IRS as nonprofit under §501(c)(3) of the United States 
Tax Code versus a U.S. hospital classified by the IRS as for profit. 
H1:  Higher quality levels increase the likelihood that a US hospital is classified 
by the IRS as nonprofit under §501(c)(3) of the United States Tax Code versus a 




To assess these hypotheses, I created a logistic regression model 
including the reference and response classifications presented in Table 3. Table 4 
displays the results of the analysis.  
Table 3 
Independent Variable Classifications: Hospital Ownership 
 Observed Predicted 
  Hospital Ownership Percentage 




.0 0 533 .0 
Nonprofit Hospital
d 
1.0 0 2168 100.0 
Overall Percentage   80.3 
a. Constant is included in the model. b. The cut value is .500. c. For-profit is the reference classification. d. Nonprofit is 
the Response classification. 
Table 4 
Binary Logistic Regression:  
Predictive Power of Quality on Hospital Ownership Structure 
  95% CI for Odds Ratio 
 B (SE) Lower Odds Ratio Upper 
Included     
Constant 8.89    
Quality .07* (.01) 1.05 1.07* 1.09 
 
Note: R2 = .06 (Homesmer and Lameshow), .02 (Cox & Snell), .03 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(2) = 56.16, p = .000. 
 * p =.000 
 
The odds ratio, Exp(B), displayed in Table 4 is a good indicator of effect size.  It 
indicates the change in the odds that a hospital will be nonprofit given a change in the 
predictor. The correlation between quality and ownership structure was significant and 
positive (b = 0.07; Exp(B) = 1.07; p = .000). These results indicate that for each unit 
increase in quality, a hospital is 1.07 times more likely to be nonprofit than for-profit. It 
also indicates that 7% of the difference in the likelihood a hospital is nonprofit as 
opposed to for-profit is attributable to quality. The range of the 95% confidence interval 




direction of the relationship observed in the sample is the same in the 
population, though as noted above, in this case the sample includes the entire population. 
The second set of null hypotheses and research hypotheses I proposed to help 
answer my research question was: 
H0: There is no difference in the likelihood that a U.S. hospital with a high level 
of access is classified by the IRS as nonprofit under §501(c)(3) of the United 
States Tax Code versus a U.S. hospital classified by the IRS as for profit. 
H1: Higher access levels increase the likelihood that a U.S. hospital is classified 
by the IRS as nonprofit under §501(c)(3) of the United States Tax Code versus a 
U.S. hospital classified by the IRS as for profit. 
To assess this second set of hypotheses, I created a logistic regression model 
including the reference and response classifications presented in Table 5. The total 
sample size included in this analysis, 2305, differs from that included in the previous 
analysis due to missing data as previously described. Table 6 displays the results of the 
analysis.  
Table 5 
Independent Variable Classifications: Hospital Ownership 
 Observed Predicted 
  Hospital Ownership Percentage 




.0 20 355 .0 
Nonprofit Hospital
d 
1.0 21 1908 100.0 
Overall Percentage   80.3 
a. Constant is included in the model. b. The cut value is .500. c. For-profit is the reference classification. d. Nonprofit is 









Binary Logistic Regression:  
Predictive Power of Access on Hospital Ownership Structure 
  95% CI for Odds Ratio 
 B (SE) Lower Odds Ratio Upper 
Included     
Constant 6.03    
Access -1.98* (.235) 0.09 .14* .22 
 
Note: R2 = .03 (Homesmer and Lameshow), .02 (Cox & Snell), .03 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(2) = 18.98, p = .000.  
* p =.000 
The correlation between access and ownership structure was significant and 
negative (b = -1.98; Exp(B) = .14; p = .000).  These results are statistically significant, 
and they indicate that for each unit increase in the predictor variable access, a hospital is 
less likely to be for-profit than nonprofit. Thus, a hospital that provides higher levels of 
access as indicated by a low service mix profitability score is .14 times more likely to be 
nonprofit than for-profit. The range of the 95% confidence interval for these figures is 
completely less than 1 for the relationship, suggesting that the direction of the 
relationship observed in the sample is the same in the population though again, in this 
case the sample includes the entire population of hospitals who reported data. These 
results allow me to reject my null hypotheses and infer support for my research 
hypothesis.  
Assessing the Models 
According to Field (2009), logistic regression must meet several assumptions.  
Linearity is assumed in the relationship between the predictors and the dependent 
variable using the logit of any categorical variables for the comparison, the errors 




assumed to be absent among the predictors (Field, 2009). According to Field 
(2009), incomplete information from the predictors, complete separation, and over 
dispersion in the data can also cause problems.  
Assumption violations are related to the generalizability of the model. Since the 
sample in this case included the entire population, there is no need to generalize the 
model from the sample to the entire population. Assumption violations, such as violations 
of the multicollinearity assumption, can also call effect sizes into question which can 
limit a researcher’s ability to infer causality. However, Voss (2005) indicated that, though 
issues with multicollinearity may call predictor effect sizes into question, they do not 
affect the predictive power of the model. Thus, if one’s intent is to establish a correlation, 
but not infer causality, a violation of multicollinearity is not a significant issue. Since I 
was interested in establishing that a relationship exists rather than determining causality a 
potential violation of the multicollinearity assumption would not have been a significant 
issue.  
The above discussion of the mulitcollinearity assumption aside, I did not assess 
the models for violations of it. Since interaction effects between the predictors were not 
of interest in this study, I controlled for them by simply running two separate regression 
models with a single predictor in each model as described above. Thus, I avoided all 
potential confounding interaction effects, as the single predictor in each model had no 
other predictor with which to interact in the model.  
To assess the models, I tested the linearity of the relationships between the 




the interaction of the predictor and its logit as Field (2009) described. The 
interaction between quality and its logit was significant (p = .087) indicating that the 
assumption had been met for the first model. The interaction between access and its logit 
was also significant  (p = .198) indicating that the assumption was met for the second 
model as well. 
I then examined the residuals for each model. For the first model analyzing 
quality, around 8% of the cases in the data had standardized residuals that exceeded ±2 
and 19 of those cases had standardized residuals that exceeded ±3. I examined the Cook’s 
Distance associated with each case with a standardized residual exceeding ±2 and found 
that none exceeded 1, indicating that none of these cases had an undue influence over the 
model. In addition, none of the cases exceeded 2 times the average leverage. Overall, 
these indicators suggest the data is a good fit for the model. 
For the second model analyzing access, around 9% of the cases in the data had 
standardized residuals exceeding ±2 and 50 of those cases had standardized residuals that 
exceeded ±3. I examined the Cook’s Distance associated with each case with a 
standardized residual that exceeded ±2 and found that none exceeded 1, indicating that 
none of these cases had an undue influence over the model. In addition, none of the cases 
exceeded 2 times the average leverage. Overall, these indicators suggest the data is a 
good fit for the model. 
Finally, I further assessed goodness of fit using the Hosmer and Lameshow test as 
Field (2009) suggested; statistical significance in this test is an indicator of badness of fit. 




model one assessing the predictive power of quality on hospital ownership, the 
test shows non significance (p = .347) indicating that the data is not a bad fit for the 
model. The test for the model assessing the predictive power of access on hospital 
ownership, however, was significant (p = .008), indicating the data is a bad fit for the 
model. This identified the second model as unreliable.  
Table 7 
Hosmer and Lameshow 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 1: Quality 8.943 8 .347 
Model 2: Access 22.439 8 .008 
 
Post Hoc Analysis 
Given that the Hosmer and Lameshow test indicated the data was a bad fit for the 
access model, I performed a post hoc analysis on the data to further examine the 
predictive power of access on hospital ownership. I recoded the data such that the patient 
profitability index score for each hospital represented the sum of all scores for that 
hospital. Then I divided the index scores into three categories: highly profitable, neutral 
profitability, and unprofitable. I assigned a 1, 2, and 3 to these categories, respectively. 
Using the recoded data, I performed a binary logistic regression analysis to further 
assess how well the level of access a hospital provides predicts its ownership structure. In 
this model, both the independent variable, access, and the dependent variable, ownership 
structure, were categorical. I used a simple contrast that compared the second and third 
independent variable categories, neutral profitability and unprofitable, to the first, or 
baseline category, high profitability. As the baseline, high profitability was not 




opposed to for-profit predicted by the model. The model first measured the 
difference between the likelihood a baseline hospital would be nonprofit and the 
likelihood a neutrally profitable hospital would be nonprofit. Then, it measured the 
difference between the likelihood a baseline hospital would be nonprofit and the 
likelihood an unprofitable hospital would be nonprofit. The model included the reference 
and response classifications presented in Table 8. Table 9 displays the results of the 
analysis.  
Table 8 
Independent Variable Classifications: Hospital Ownership 
 Observed Predicted 
  Hospital Ownership Percentage 




.0 0 375 .0 
Nonprofit Hospital
d 
1.0 0 1930 100.0 
Overall Percentage   83.7 
a. Constant is included in the model. b. The cut value is .500. c. For-profit is the reference classification. d. Nonprofit is 
the Response classification. 
Table 9 
Binary Logistic Regression:  
Predictive Power of Access on Hospital Ownership Structure 
  95% CI for Odds Ratio 
 B (SE) Lower Odds Ratio Upper 
Included     
Constant 1.26    
Access (Highly Profitable) Baseline 
Access (Neutral Profitability) 1.73* (.263) 3.36 5.63* 9.43 
Access (Unprofitable) .276** (.137) 1.01 1.32** 1.72 
 
Note: R2 = .03 (Homesmer and Lameshow), .03 (Cox & Snell), .05 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(2) = 62.02, p = .000.  
* p =.000, ** p = .04 
 
This model indicated that the correlation between access, as indicated by neutral 
profitability, and ownership structure was significant and positive (b = 1.73; Exp(B) = 




more likely to be nonprofit than for-profit. The range of the 95% confidence 
interval for these figures is completely greater than 1 for the relationship, suggesting that 
the direction of the relationship observed in the sample is the same in the population, 
though, like all other analyses in this study, the sample included the entire population. 
The model also indicated that the correlation between access, as indicated by low 
profitability, and ownership structure was significant and positive (b = .276; Exp(B) = 
.1.32; p = .04). Therefore, the analysis showed that a hospital that provides a higher level 
of access is more likely to be nonprofit than for-profit. These results indicate that an 
unprofitable hospital is 1.32 times more likely to be nonprofit than for-profit. The range 
of the 95% confidence interval for these figures is completely greater than 1 for the 
relationship, suggesting that the direction of the relationship observed in the sample is the 
same in the population. In light of this more detailed post hoc explanatory model, the 
results of this analysis therefore allowed me to reject my null hypothesis and infer partial 
support for my research hypothesis, as the effect size for the neutrally profitable 
classification was much larger than that of the unprofitable classification.  
Assessing the Model 
I assessed this model using the same techniques used to assess the prior models. 
Similar to my assessment of those models, I did not assess this model for violations of 
multicollinearity, as this model included only one predictor. Thus, potential confounding 
interaction effects were not an issue.  
As in my previous assessments, I tested the linearity of the relationships between 




are the interaction of the predictor and its logit. The interaction between access 
and its logit was non-significant (p = .41) indicating that the assumption had been met for 
the model. Then I examined the residuals for the model. Around 11% of the cases in the 
data had standardized residuals that exceeded ±2 and 19 of those cases had standardized 
residuals that exceeded ±3. I examined the Cook’s Distance associated with each case 
with a standardized residual exceeding ±2 and found that none exceeded 1, indicating that 
none of these cases had an undue influence over the model. Around 35% of the cases had 
leverage values that exceeded 2 times the average leverage. Given that the Cook’s 
distances indicated that none of the cases was having an undue influence over the model, 
this was of little concern. Overall, these indicators suggest the data is a good fit for the 
model. 
Finally, I assessed goodness of fit using the Hosmer and Lameshow test. Table 7 
displays the statistics associated with this assessment.  The test shows non significance (p 
= .347) indicating that the data is not a bad fit for the model. Overall, my assessment of 
this post hoc model indicated that the model does not violate any of the assumptions 
associated with logistic regression and that the data is a good fit for the model. 
Table 10 
Hosmer and Lameshow 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Model 3: Access (Categorical) 8.943 8 .347 
Summary 
Overall, the results of these logistic regression analyses indicate that hospitals that 
provide higher levels of quality and access are indeed more likely to be nonprofit than 




research hypotheses. The assessment of the quality model indicates that it is a 
good fit for the data. Though the assessment of the first access model indicated that the 
data is a bad fit for the model, the assessment of the post hoc model, where data 
transformations were conducted to better examine the relationships between the 
variables, indicated that it is. These results are consistent with the related literature 






Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to seek evidence that 
nonprofit hospitals provide better quality and access than their for-profit counterparts. 
The study was conducted to add to the body of knowledge related to hospital behavior so 
as to provide policymakers with more complete information as they make decisions 
related to the tax treatment of hospitals. As with previous literature in this area, the 
results of the study are mixed. They indicate that nonprofit hospitals in an economic 
relationship with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) are indeed 
more likely to provide higher levels of quality and access than their for-profit 
counterparts, though perhaps nominal levels. This chapter will include a discussion of the 
implications of these results for public policy, social change, and further research one can 
draw from the results. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
The results of this study extend knowledge in public administration and the 
hospital industry in several ways. In addition, they appear to be consistent with literature 
related to the study’s theoretical framework, stewardship theory. This section will include 
a discussion of the findings in the context of the relevant literature and theoretical 
framework.  
Literature 
The results of this study address several areas of need noted in the literature 




and nonprofit hospitals, the lack of a definition for community benefit, and the 
lack of knowledge related to government contractor behavior in certain industries. 
Differences in nonprofit and for-profit hospital behavior. The study’s focus 
was to provide evidence that nonprofit hospitals behave differently than their for-profit 
counterparts and thus deserve the tax exemptions they receive. The results of this study 
provide such evidence in that they indicate that nonprofit hospitals do provide higher 
quality and access levels than their for-profit counterparts. However, the effect sizes 
indicated by the model are small; thus it appears unlikely that the increased quality and 
access nonprofits are likely to provide justifies the tax exemption. Further study is needed 
to determine the value of the increased quality and access they provide to assess whether 
this is the case.  
For the first variable under examination, perceived quality, the results indicate 
that a hospital providing a higher level of quality is 1.07 times more likely to be nonprofit 
than for-profit. The predictor accounted for 7% of the difference in the likelihood that a 
hospital providing a higher level of quality is nonprofit as opposed to for-profit predicted 
by the model. This supports the conclusion that removing nonprofit hospitals’ tax exempt 
status could negatively affect the amount of community benefit associated with quality 
that those hospitals provide. However, it gives no indication of how much value is 
associated with the difference in quality. Further study is needed to determine the value 
of the increased quality nonprofit hospitals in an economic relationship with CMS 





With regard to the second variable under examination, the results of the 
initial model proved unreliable. However, the results of the post hoc analysis indicated 
that hospitals providing higher levels of access are more likely to be nonprofit than for-
profit. Therefore, nonprofits provide more value associated with access than for-profits. 
The predictive relationship is stronger for hospitals with neutral profitability, as they are 
over five times more likely to be nonprofit than for-profit and the model indicates that 
73% of the predictive power of the model is attributable to neutral profitability. The 
remaining 27% is attributable to unprofitability; unprofitable hospitals are 1.31 times 
more likely to be non-profit than for-profit. This supports the conclusion that removing 
nonprofit hospitals’ tax exempt status could negatively affect the amount of community 
benefit associated with access that those hospitals provide. However, as with the quality 
model, it gives no indication of how much value is associated with the difference in 
hospital behavior. 
Though the question of value cannot be addressed in this analysis, one can 
examine the predictive power of the models and the extent to which that power is 
attributable to the predictors. The Hosmer and Lameshow’s 𝑅𝐿
2 for the quality model was 
.06. This is an indication that the model only accounted for 6% of the total variation in 
ownership structure. As mentioned above, the variable under examination in that model, 
perceived quality, only accounted for 7% of the difference predicted by the model in the 
likelihood that a hospital providing a higher level of quality is nonprofit as opposed to 




The post hoc access model also has modest predictive value. The 
Hosmer and Lameshow’s 𝑅𝐿
2 for the model was .03.This is an indication that only 3% of 
the total variation in ownership structure can be accounted for by access. For the access 
model, though 100% of the predictive power of the model is attributable to two relevant 
levels of access, this only accounts for 3% of the total variation in ownership structure.  
Given the small percentages discussed above, further study may very well find 
that even though nonprofit hospitals are likely to provide more quality and access than 
their for-profit counterparts, the value of that added quality and access does not meet or 
exceed the value the foregone tax revenue could provide in other policy areas. Indeed, 
one might expect the value of the added community benefit nonprofits are likely to 
provide to be considerably less than the value associated with the realization of currently 
forgone tax revenue. One should take care, however, to note that the results of this study 
provide no evidence that this so. 
Focus on indigent care. The results of this study do provide some evidence that 
the near-exclusive focus on indigent care as a measure of community benefit noted in 
Chapter 2 is misguided. If policymakers were to decide to remove the tax exemption for 
nonprofit hospitals based on studies focusing exclusively on indigent care that indicate 
there is no difference between nonprofit and for-profit hospital behavior, communities 
would lose the benefit associated with the higher quality and access levels this study 
indicates nonprofits provide, though, as noted above, that benefit appears unlikely to 
justify the tax exemption. Quality and access, as defined in this study, however, were not 




study’s execution; those potentially relevant variables not examined here 
remain to be studied. Further research may identify variables such as the technical quality 
of care or the incidence of nosocomial infection that, like quality and access, may be 
more or less likely to be found among nonprofits than for-profits. In sum, the added value 
associated with those variables in terms of community benefit may be found to justify the 
tax exemptions nonprofits enjoy.  
Limited evidence. The results of this study augment the limited knowledge of 
stewardship in government contractor behavior across various industries noted in Chapter 
2. These results support the conclusion that the hospital industry is one in which 
nonprofits tend to behave differently than their for-profit counterparts. Indeed, this study 
provides evidence that they are better stewards of the public good, as discussed in the 
following section. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework associated with this study is stewardship theory. As 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2, according to stewardship theory, agents will, under 
certain circumstances, act in their principals’ best interest regardless of the existence of 
external control mechanisms emplaced to force them to do so. In doing this, they will 
become stewards of their principals’ best interest. As discussed, the circumstances under 
which stewardship develops may include nonprofit status. The results of this study 
support this assertion; however, they do so weakly. In the hospital industry, stewardship 
may develop among nonprofits while for-profits remain agents as described by agency 




stewards of the public good than their for-profit counterparts as measured on 
the defined variables:  perceived quality and access. 
Limitations of the Study 
As with any research study, the current study had limitations. There are several 
limitations associated with the analysis described in Chapter 4. In addition, this study 
provides no information related to the public value associated with the effect size 
determined by the logistic regression models. Finally, one should note that these results 
apply only to nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in an economic relationship with the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; to apply them to hospitals that rely 
exclusively on other forms of reimbursement or those with a different IRS tax status 
classification would be erroneous. The following section will discuss these limitations in 
turn. 
Model Limitations 
The current models are limited in two significant ways. The first, and perhaps 
most pronounced limitation, is that I used prior research to identify which services are 
profitable and which ones are not rather than attempting to determine the actual 
profitability of each hospital service through an examination of hospitals’ financial 
reports. Though this is not unprecedented in the literature, it forces one to assume that a 
hospital service is profitable or unprofitable under every potential circumstance. Each 
hospital operates under a particular set of circumstances, however; in reality, it may be 
that a service is more or less profitable under a certain set of circumstances than Horwitz 




more services at individual facilities as more or less profitable than they are at 
those particular hospitals. 
The second limitation associated with the models follows from the use of the post 
hoc analysis to examine my second set of hypotheses. In Chapter 4, I made an argument 
that using sums of profitability measures rather than means of those measures could 
result in a misidentification of a hospital’s service mix profitability. That argument still 
holds, though the data coded in such a way as to avoid this danger proved a poor fit for 
the model. When I recoded the data into categorical level, I lost the advantage of 
avoiding the potential misidentification of a hospital’s overall service mix profitability 
discussed in Chapter 4, as a mean is not an applicable measure of central tendency  in 
categorical level data.  The post hoc analysis was the next best method for examining the 
hypotheses, though it may have misidentified the hospitals’ service mix profitability. 
Causality 
As noted in Chapter 1, this study was limited in that its quasi-experimental nature 
resulted in an inability to establish a causal relationship between the variables.  A true 
experiment would have allowed for such control, but it would not have been possible to 
design such a study. The quasi-experimental design used here allowed the most feasible 
control for threats to internal validity as possible for the study.    
Value 
The logistic regression models presented in Chapter 4 illustrate that hospitals in 
an economic relationship with CMS that provide higher levels of quality and access are 




much value the difference in likelihood represents. Therefore, based on the 
results of this study alone, there is no way to determine whether the added value 
nonprofits are likely to provide to their communities justifies the expense to governments 
associated with forgoing the tax revenue those hospitals would generate if forced to 
become for-profit, though intuitively, as discussed above, it appears unlikely that they do. 
However, to make a normative judgment about nonprofit hospitals’ tax exemption would 
be premature if based on such an assumption. 
Population 
One should avoid applying the results of this study to all hospitals. The population 
here includes only those hospitals in an economic relationship with CMS. There are a 
number of U.S. hospitals that do not receive funding through CMS. Though theoretically, 
such hospitals that provide higher levels of quality and access are more likely to be 
nonprofit than for-profit, this study does not offer any evidence that this is so.   
Recommendations 
This study represents the first step in a line of research. My results indicate that 
there is a relationship between levels of quality and access hospitals in an economic 
relationship with CMS provide and ownership structure. However, it leaves many 
questions unexamined, several of which are noted above. In this section, I will offer 
recommendations for further research. 
Service Profitability 
Further research is needed that examines the actual profitability of hospital 




obtaining the actual financial results associated with the services offered by 
individual hospitals. Doing so would avoid the danger associated with using prior 
research to identify services as either profitable or unprofitable as I did in this study. 
Levels of Access 
The results of my post hoc analysis indicated that the odds that a hospital in an 
economic relationship with CMS that provides a high level of access is nonprofit as 
opposed to for-profit are greater if that hospital has neutral profitability than if it is 
unprofitable. The analysis provides no explanation for this. As this is a new development, 
it is not explained or discussed in the extant literature. I recommend further examination 
of this phenomenon; it may provide insight into variables that may affect service offering 
choice such as hospital size or affiliation status. 
Causality 
As this study is limited in that it does not provide evidence of a causal 
relationship between the variables, I recommend further research that seeks evidence 
specifically focused to examine causal relationships. This could be accomplished by 
identifying potentially confounding variables and controlling for their effects in the 
model. Another approach could be to study variables that may be responsible for part of 
the correlation as stand-alone predictors. For example, nurses with a certain personality 
type may be attracted to nonprofit work and employees with that personality type may be 
more likely to provide higher quality care. Thus, personality type among nurses may 
represent the actual cause in the relationship observed in this study. Identifying such 




Quality, Access, and Market Mix 
This study provides a foundation upon which to expand the work noted in Chapter 
2 related to differences between nonprofit and for-profit hospital behavior and market 
mix. Perhaps hospitals in a relationship with CMS behave differently from other hospitals 
with the same ownership structure when they are the only facility in a market as opposed 
to when they are in competition with other hospitals with the same or different ownership 
structures. Examining related questions would provide policy makers with information 
they could use to make decisions at a regional or local level. 
Value 
I recommend researchers interested in healthcare economics devise methods 
through which to attach economic value to the difference in the likelihood that hospitals 
that provide better quality and more access are nonprofit rather than for-profit observed 
here. This would provide a means through which to measure the extent of the difference 
in the value hospitals with different ownership structures are likely to provide. Such 
information would assist policy makers as they make judgments related to the tax 
treatment of hospitals because they would have a method through which to determine 
whether the value added exceeds forgone tax revenue.  
Expansion 
Nonprofit hospitals are not the only healthcare facilities that receive tax 
exemptions. As noted in Chapter 2, stewardship is more prevalent among nonprofits as 
opposed to for-profits in certain industries, but not in others. The results of this study 




provides no evidence that it is so among healthcare facilities outside the 
population under examination. For example, one cannot claim that this study provides 
evidence that healthcare facilities that do not receive funding through CMS and provide 
high levels of quality and access are more likely to be nonprofit than for-profit. I 
recommend studying such facilities so as to provide policy makers with more complete 
information upon which to base decisions. This would also be true of research in this area 
related to healthcare providers other than hospitals such as walk-in clinics and home 
health organizations. 
Implications 
This study’s implications are relatively narrow, as the study represents a first step 
in a line of research. The study does, however, have implications for positive social 
change, research, and practice. This section will detail those implications.  
Positive Social Change 
This study has implications for positive social change in that it is an early step in 
either protecting nonprofit hospitals’ tax exemptions or allowing governments around the 
country to realize the currently forgone tax revenue associated with those benefits. 
Governments at all levels could use that revenue to provide social value in other policy 
areas. My results imply that removing or restricting the tax exemptions would likely 
result in a loss of community benefit associated with quality and access which, as noted 
in Chapter 2, has social value. Though my results also imply that quality and access by 
themselves are unlikely to provide enough social value to justify the tax exemptions, I 




the policy area. Thus, further research is needed to identify other relevant 
variables and attach value to any differences in for-profit and nonprofit hospital behavior. 
Practice and Research 
The results of this study have implications for practice and research. They imply 
that nonprofit hospitals are likely to provide benefits to their communities that are, in 
practice, not generally thought of as community benefit. Indeed, perceived quality and 
access are not generally identified as a component of community benefit for tax purposes, 
but this study implies that they are relevant to any discussion of the concept. In addition, 
my results support the use of broad operational definitions of community benefit that 
include potentially relevant variables like quality and access in research in this area. 
Recommendations for Practice 
Industry associations such as the Catholic Hospital Association and the American 
Hospital Association, researchers, policy makers, hospital administrators, and other 
relevant stakeholders should reexamine the status quo as it relates to community benefit. 
The industry needs specific guidance on what is and what is not community benefit that 
addresses concepts like quality and access that have not historically been considered as 
contributors to that benefit. Researchers should provide empirical evidence like that 
presented in this study, policy makers should use that evidence to create effective tax 
policy, industry associations should use that policy to create guidance, and hospital 
administrators should use that guidance to identify and expand the community benefit 
their facilities provide. Policy makers should then use that information to hold hospitals 





This study presents evidence that nonprofit U.S. hospitals in an economic 
relationship with CMS are better stewards of the public good than their for-profit 
counterparts. Hospitals that provide higher levels of quality and access are more likely to 
be nonprofit than for-profit. As quality and access were previously unstudied in this 
context, the results indicate that the near-exclusive focus on indigent care as an indicator 
of community benefit is misguided. Indeed, if policy makers forced nonprofit hospitals to 
become for-profit based solely on evidence that they provide a similar level of indigent 
care as their for-profit counterparts, communities would lose the added quality and access 
benefits the results of this study indicate nonprofits are likely to provide. This supports 
the argument that definitions of community benefit should be revisited and variables 
other than the level of provided indigent care should be included in any definition of the 
term. Though my results indicate that nonprofit hospitals are likely to provide slightly 
more quality and access than for-profit hospitals, one should take care to avoid making a 
normative judgment about nonprofit hospitals’ tax exemptions based exclusively on this 
study. I have made the argument that the lack of evidence available to policy makers 
upon which to base such judgments is an issue in the hospital industry. Though the 
evidence presented here begins to fill that gap by identifying the hospital industry as one 
in which stewardship theory may be more applicable than agency theory, it by no means 
does so completely. Questions related to potentially relevant variables other than quality 
and access, causation, and the value of the added benefit nonprofits are likely to provide 




small effect sizes, the actual social value associated with the differences in 
nonprofit and for-profit hospital behavior do not justify the tax exemptions, though this 
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